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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of DNA testing, numerous issues have arisen in 
regard to obtaining and using evidence that results from such testing.  
As courts have come to regard DNA testing as a reliable method for 
linking some people to crimes and for exonerating others, these issues 
are especially significant.1  The federal government and most states have 
                                                 
* The author is the Dean Julius Isaacson Professor at the University of Baltimore School 
of Law. He would like to thank Matthew Gannett and Erika Flaschner for their invaluable 
assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
1 See Lisa Carrabino, Note, The Admissibility of DNA Typing and Statistical Probability 
Evidence, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 473, 495 n.156 (1995) (citing State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 468 
(Mont. 1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gollehon, 906 P.2d 697 (Mont. 1995); State 
v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512 (Wash. 1993) (en banc); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 
986–88 (Sup. Ct. 1989)) (discussing the admissibility of DNA testing in the states); see also 
Veronia Valdivieso, Note, DNA Warrants:  A Panacea for Old Rape Cases?, 90 GEO. L.J. 1009, 
1021 n.98 (2002) (referencing cases such as Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144, 159 (Kan. 1991); 
Mandujano v. State, 799 S.W.2d 318, 321–22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Snowden v. State, 574 So. 
2d 960, 966 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989)). 
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enacted statutes that permit or direct the testing of those convicted of 
certain crimes.2  Courts have almost universally approved such testing, 
rejecting arguments that obtaining and using such evidence violates the 
Fourth Amendment.3 
More recently, the government has enacted laws permitting or 
directing the taking of DNA samples from those arrested for, but not yet 
convicted of, certain serious crimes.4  Courts had been far more divided 
about the constitutionality of DNA testing for arrestees than they were 
for the comparable testing of those already convicted.5  Given the 
division in the holdings among both state and federal courts and the 
increasing importance of DNA evidence in criminal investigations, it is 
hardly surprising that the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case 
regarding the constitutionality of a Maryland statute allowing for such 
testing.6 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006) (listing the crimes that require arrestees to have a 
DNA sample taken); see also Richard Williams & Sarah Hammond, Building Forensic 
Technology Capacity, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS. 17–19 (2009), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/cj/forensictechnology09.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LSK2-FPU6 (providing a list of states and the crimes that require 
arrestees to provide DNA samples in each). 
3 See, e.g., State v Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 43 (Md. 2004) (upholding the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the Wisconsin 
DNA collection law); Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413–14 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (upholding the federal DNA collection law); Velasquez v. Woods, 
329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding the Texas DNA collection law); 
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 76–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the Connecticut DNA 
collection law); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
Colorado DNA collection law); Schlicher v. Peters 103 F.3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding the Kansas DNA collection law); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305–08 (4th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992) (upholding the Virginia DNA collection law).  
Additionally, some federal district courts have upheld state DNA collection laws.  See 
Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342–44 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (upholding the Georgia 
DNA collection law); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588–89 (D. Minn. 1995) 
(upholding the Minnesota DNA collection law). 
4 See supra note 2 (listing examples of crimes that require DNA sampling for arrestees 
according to federal law). 
5 For cases upholding the DNA testing of arrestees to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), see United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 
387, 415–16 (3rd Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 
2010), vacated on other grounds 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011); Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 
482–83 (Az. 2012); Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1189–90 (N.D. Ca. 2009); and 
Anderson v. Virginia, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706–08 (Va. 2007).  For cases invalidating such testing, 
see Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 860 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Purdy, 2005 WL 
3465721 (D. Neb. 2005); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (2011), review granted and 
opinion superseded by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011); and King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 
580–81 (Md. 2012). 
6 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (scrutinizing a Maryland statue regarding the 
constitutionality of DNA testing). 
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The Court decided in Maryland v. King (King II) that DNA testing of 
arrestees and the use of the samples obtained by those tests to identify 
the subjects of the testing and to link them to other criminal activity does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.7  Unfortunately, the Court’s 
justification for this conclusion focused primarily on the use of the 
samples to identify the arrestee, specifically to make sure that the person 
under arrest was either who he claimed to be or was shown to be 
through fingerprint comparison.8  While identification is one purpose of 
DNA testing, law enforcement generally acknowledges that the most 
valuable use of DNA samples is to compare them with samples found at 
the scenes of serious crimes.9  Such a comparison helps solve unsolved 
crimes, leads to the arrest and conviction of those responsible for such 
crimes and the exoneration of those who may have been wrongfully 
charged or convicted.10  The Court in King II spent comparatively little 
time on the constitutionality of this vital purpose for DNA testing and 
either omitted or responded without sufficient depth to many of the 
arguments that had been raised in opposition to DNA testing of 
arrestees.11  As such, the opinion in King II was somewhat disingenuous.  
This disingenuousness provided fodder for critics of this DNA testing 
such as Justice Scalia, whose dissent in King II mocked the Court’s 
emphasis on identification as the purpose of the testing.12 
The overall failure of the Court to respond to arguments raised by 
lower courts and commentators to DNA testing of arrestees is 
particularly unfortunate because there are persuasive responses to those 
arguments and sound reasoning why such testing complies with the 
Fourth Amendment.13  The arguments advanced by opponents of DNA 
testing of arrestees fall basically into two categories.14  The first category 
relates to the presumption of innocence.15  In distinguishing between the 
DNA testing of those already convicted of crimes, and those who have 
only been arrested, some courts and commentators have emphasized 
                                                 
7 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980. 
8 See infra Part VII.A (discussing the “primary purpose” test and its application to 
statutes that require arrestees to have DNA samples collected). 
9 See infra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing DNA sample statutes that do not 
limit use of the results). 
10 See infra Part V.A.2 (explaining the second step in the reasonableness balancing test). 
11 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (demonstrating the Court’s focus). 
12 See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (analyzing Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Maryland v. King). 
13 See infra Parts VI & VII (conveying the arguments for the constitutionality of DNA 
testing). 
14 See generally King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1966–80 (advancing all arguments surrounding DNA 
testing). 
15 Id. at 1974. 
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that the latter group of individuals is bathed in the presumption of 
innocence.16  While this is certainly the case, this Article argues that the 
principles related to the presumption have little, if any, relevance to the 
constitutionality of DNA testing of arrestees.17 
The second category of arguments advanced in opposition to the 
DNA testing of arrestees revolves around the criteria adopted by the 
Supreme Court to assess the legality of government intrusions into areas 
protected by the Fourth Amendment when there is no individualized 
suspicion that would justify a search or seizure.18  These arguments focus 
on the balancing test the Court uses in such searches and seizures—that 
is, analyzing the extent of the government intrusion involved and 
balancing it against the societal need to conduct such intrusions.19  This 
Article will posit that when the statute enabling the DNA testing of 
arrestees is limited in scope, as is the Maryland statute at issue in King II, 
the benefits to be achieved by such testing outweigh the minor intrusion 
to the arrestees.20  The other argument regarding searches and seizures 
without individualized suspicion relies on previous decisions of the 
Supreme Court which held some such suspicionless searches to be in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment if their primary purpose was to 
ferret out evidence of a crime rather than achieve some other societal 
benefit.21  This Article demonstrates that such holdings are inconsistent, 
confusing, and incompatible with the principles on which the Fourth 
Amendment is based.22 
Additionally, an important factor in the Court’s application of the 
balancing test has been whether the subject of the search or seizure has a 
diminished expectation of privacy.23  The Court has given greater 
latitude to government agencies to conduct intrusions into areas 
normally considered protected by the Fourth Amendment when the 
targets of those searches or seizures have a diminished expectation of 
privacy.24  Those who are arrested and placed in full custodial facilities, 
                                                 
16 See infra Part IV (conveying the constitutional argument against DNA sampling). 
17 See infra Part IV (elaborating on the presumption of innocence). 
18 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1981. 
19 See infra Part V.A.1–3 (discussing the extent of intrusion of DNA testing); see also 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (describing the balancing test and how it is 
applied to cases). 
20 See infra Part VI (demonstrating the several crimes that have been solved because of 
DNA testing). 
21 See infra notes 352–62 and accompanying text (discussing the “closely regulated 
business doctrine,” which allows states to address social problems by both an 
administrative scheme and thorough penal sanctions). 
22 See infra Part V.A.1–3 (advancing arguments surrounding DNA testing). 
23 See infra Part VI (addressing privacy expectations). 
24 See infra Part VI (assessing an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy). 
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such as jails, have a significantly diminished expectation of privacy and 
therefore are more susceptible to certain intrusions on their Fourth 
Amendment rights, especially when those intrusions are effected in a 
non-arbitrary manner.25 
DNA testing has played an important role in leading to the release 
and even exoneration of an increasing number of those who have been 
convicted of serious crimes.26  For various reasons, prosecutors have 
often argued, often successfully, against obtaining DNA samples from 
those convicted of crimes and comparing them to the samples found at 
other crime scenes.27  This opposition is for the most part unfortunate, as 
defense attorneys and various innocence projects have successfully used 
these results to demonstrate the innocence of those convicted of serious 
crimes, or at least show a reasonable doubt of a convicted individual’s 
guilt.28 
There is something to be said for the notion that because DNA 
science has been shown to be reliable when the testing process is done 
correctly, its use should be maximized with respect to insuring that the 
right perpetrators are convicted as often as possible for any crime where 
DNA evidence is available.  Unless absolutely necessary, there should be 
as few barriers as possible to the use of such critical evidence by 
prosecutors or defendants.  In our constitutional system, a goose and 
gander argument such as this one, has its limits.  Regardless of the 
probative value of certain evidence, if the government obtains it through 
means prohibited by constitutional protections, such as those embodied 
in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, the evidence should not be 
available to the government.29  To some extent, this conclusion leads in a 
                                                 
25 See infra Part V.A.3 (expressing concern that searches without individualized 
suspicion that are conducted at the discretion of officers may be arbitrary). 
26 See infra Part V.B (explaining the second step in the reasonableness balancing test 
which looks at the nature of the government interest). 
27 See Shaila Dewan, Prosecutors Block Access to DNA Testing for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (May 
17, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/us/18dna.html?pagewanted= 
all&_r=1&, archived at http://perma.cc/6CSK-SPJD (reporting on DNA exonerations).  In 
2009, the New York Times reported that: 
A recent analysis of 225 DNA exonerations by Brandon L. Garrett, a 
professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, found that 
prosecutors opposed DNA testing in almost one out of five cases.  In 
many of the others, they initially opposed testing but ultimately agreed 
to it.  In 98 of those 225 cases, the DNA test identified the real culprit. 
Id. 
28 See infra Part V.B (explaining that the second step of the reasonableness balancing test 
evaluates the nature of the government interest). 
29 See generally U.S. CONST. amends. IV–VI (providing the text of the aforementioned 
amendments, including the right against search and seizure, the right against self-
incrimination, and the right to a public and speedy trial). 
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circular manner back to the original assessment of whether DNA testing 
of arrestees violates constitutional protections.30  That is not to say, 
however, that either society or the courts should minimize the benefits to 
be achieved by enhancing the likelihood of convicting the guilty and 
exonerating the innocent. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief description of the science of 
DNA testing as it is used in the criminal justice system.31  Part III 
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in King II.32  Part IV addresses 
the argument of the opponents that DNA testing of arrestees violates the 
presumption of innocence.33  The chief focus of the Article appears in 
Parts V, VI, and VII, which responds to the arguments posed by those 
who claim such testing violates the Fourth Amendment.34  Part V 
addresses the balancing test for such searches and seizures long 
employed by the Supreme Court.35  Parts VI and VII describe and 
critique the use of the primary purpose test as an important factor in 
determining whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated.36  This 
test looks to whether the primary purpose of the government’s search or 
seizure was something other than to ferret out ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing, and only in such situations excuses the absence of 
individualized suspicion.37 
In advocating a method to apply the Fourth Amendment in a 
manner that is both more consistent than the current approach and more 
faithful to the principles of the Fourth Amendment, this Article analyzes 
the constitutionality of DNA testing of arrestees for the purpose of using 
those results to compare with DNA found at the scenes of serious 
crimes.38  This analysis leads to the conclusion that such government 
conduct complies with the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment 
and other constitutional protections when such testing is done pursuant 
to statutes that remove arbitrariness and limit the use of the DNA 
                                                 
30 See infra Parts V–VII (conducting a constitutional analysis of DNA testing arrestees). 
31 See infra Part II (introducing DNA testing). 
32 See infra Part III (including a case discussion of Maryland v. King). 
33 See infra Part IV (discussing an arrestee’s presumption of innocence). 
34 See infra Parts V & VI (explaining both the balancing test for reasonableness and the 
diminished expectation of privacy). 
35 See infra Part V (including a discussion of the balancing test for reasonableness, which 
focuses on the extent of the intrusion). 
36 See infra Parts VI & VII (providing explanation of the diminished expectation of 
privacy and the primary purpose test). 
37 See infra notes 352–62 and accompanying text (discussing the “closely regulated 
business doctrine,” which allows states to address social problems by both an 
administrative scheme and thorough penal sanctions). 
38 See infra Part V.B (elaborating on the use of DNA evidence to solve other crimes). 
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samples.39  More broadly, this Article critiques some of the ways in 
which the diminished expectation of privacy rationale and the primary 
purpose doctrine have been used by the Supreme Court in assessing the 
constitutionality of searches and seizures performed without 
individualized suspicion. 
II.  TESTING OF DNA 
“Deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) is a complex molecule contained 
within each nucleated cell of the human body . . . [that] provides a 
complete blueprint for the human being.”40  During reproduction, 
chromosomes from the mother and father combine to create a new and 
unique genetic structure.41  With the exception of identical twins, no two 
individuals have identical DNA.42  DNA testing can determine the 
variations of DNA structure in each individual.43 
DNA collection for comparison purposes in criminal cases is done in 
one of two primary ways.  First, it may be accomplished by drawing 
blood.44  Currently the FBI collects blood by a finger-prick.45  Second, it 
may be done by rubbing two cotton swabs up and down the inside of 
each of the suspect’s cheeks with enough pressure to remove cells.46  If 
necessary, reasonable force may be used to obtain a DNA sample.47  
Samples are sent to the appropriate laboratory for testing.48  The samples 
are then analyzed in accordance with FBI standards and CODIS 
requirements.49  CODIS, or the Combined DNA Index System, blends 
forensic science and computer technology by storing DNA profiles at the 
local, state, and national level.50  Data stored at the national level is kept 
                                                 
39 See infra Part VIII (advancing the constitutionality of DNA testing). 




44 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(f)(1) (2011) (stating that approved methods of DNA 
collection may include blood draws); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.20 (West 2012) (providing 
that individuals convicted of sexual offenses shall have a blood sample drawn for DNA 
testing). 
45 See 73 Fed. Reg. 74,935 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 28). 
46 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(f)(1) (stating that approved methods of DNA collection may 
include the use of buccal swabs); MARCUS L. BROWN ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING 
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 22 (2012), available at https://www.mdsp.org/LinkClick.aspx? 
fileticket=UUXGHnwBnBs%3D&tabid=429&mid=1122, archived at https://perma.cc/3JKF-
TCC2. 
47 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(d) (2011); MD. CODE REGS. § 29.05.01.04(C) (2011). 
48 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(f)(2) (2011); MD. CODE REGS. § 29.05.01.04(D) (2011). 
49 28 C.F.R. § 28.13 (2011); MD. CODE REGS. § 29.05.01.04(A) (2011). 
50 What is CODIS?, NAT’L INST. JUST. (July 16, 2010), available at http://www.nij.gov/ 
journals/266/Pages/backlogs-codis.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/93ER-WE86. 
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in the National DNA Index System, or NDIS.51  CODIS was designed to 
compare a target DNA record against the DNA records contained in the 
database.52  If a match is identified by CODIS, the laboratories involved 
in the match exchange information to verify the match and establish 
coordination between the two agencies.53 
DNA analysis is done by using a Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(“PCR”) to amplify the DNA strands and analyze Short Tandem Repeats 
(“STRs”).54  Specifically, the analysis focuses on thirteen core STRs.55  
Analysis of these strands reveals the combinations of uniquely paired 
protein bases within the human genome which may be used to match the 
DNA taken from an individual to the DNA left at a crime scene.56  The 
thirteen STR strands are referred to as “junk sites” because they are not 
associated with any physical or medical characteristics.57 
Numerous steps have been taken by law enforcement agencies to 
assure that DNA testing will not reveal private information about the 
subject of the testing while assuring accurate results.58  To ensure that the 
DNA profile of a convicted offender will not be disclosed, Congress and 
many states have passed statutory rules, which provide that DNA 
samples and analyses may only be used for identification purposes.59  
Further, the thirteen “junk sites” were specifically selected for analysis 
because they do not control or influence the expression of any trait.60  
This manner of DNA analysis does not reveal information relating to 
medical conditions or other traits.61  Indeed, the system provides a 
“genetic fingerprint, which uniquely identifies an individual, but does 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, FBI, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/ 
biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 13, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KX2S-Q4A3 [hereinafter CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet]. 
53 Id. 
54 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing buccal swabs as an appropriate 
method for collecting DNA samples). 
55 Mary McCarthy, Am I My Brother's Keeper?:  Familial DNA Searches in the Twenty-First 
Century, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 384 (2011). 
56 Id.  There are literally trillions of different possible base pair combinations.  Id. 
57 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000). 
58 See, e.g., MD. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2009) (listing the procedure necessary to get a DNA 
sample). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (2006); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-505(b)(1) (2011); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 295.1 (West 2012); see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2–3 (West 2012) (stating 
that DNA shall be analyzed “to determine identification characteristics”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53:1-20.21 (West 2012) (permitting DNA testing for law enforcement identification or 
other non-intrusive purposes). 
60 See McCarthy, supra note 55, at 384 (explaining what information is contained in a 
strand of DNA). 
61 Id. 
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not provide a basis for determining or inferring anything else about the 
person.”62  Additionally, under federal and several state statutes, no 
names or other personal identifiers are stored with the DNA analysis, 
and access to the records is limited to ensure confidentiality.63  Most 
statutes require that DNA records be destroyed or expunged if the 
criminal action does not result in a conviction, a conviction is reversed, 
or if the individual is granted an unconditional pardon.64  Finally, failure 
to properly expunge DNA records or to otherwise comply with privacy 
requirements can result in fines and/or imprisonment.65 
It is extremely unlikely for DNA testing to result in false positive 
identifications and comparisons.66  When analyzing the thirteen STRs, 
the probability of a random match of DNA evidence found at a crime 
scene and a DNA sample are between one in a billion and one in a 
quadrillion.67  Thus, DNA testing can identify an individual with more 
than 99% accuracy.68 
The reliability of DNA testing is an important factor when using the 
balancing test employed by courts to determine if a search or seizure 
performed without some degree of individualized suspicion meets the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.69  As discussed in Part V, one 
factor in that test is the importance of the government need to conduct 
                                                 
62 Id.; see also CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 52 (discussing the purpose of 
CODIS and NDIS). 
63 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-511(a)(1) (2011) (providing a state statute that 
discusses the identifying information available from DNA testing); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 299.5–299.7 (West 2012) (explaining the identifying information made available by DNA 
samples); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.6 (West 2012) (providing federal and state statutes 
regarding the identifying information DNA samples make available). 
64 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-511(a)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299; VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 19.2-310.7; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.25 (West 2012). 
65 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-512 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.7; N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 53:1-20.26.  All of these statutes relay the penalty for disclosing information in the 
DNA database.  Anyone who intentionally and wrongfully discloses information in the 
DNA database is guilty of a disorderly person offense, which is a misdemeanor that can 
carry a prison sentence of up to six months.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-8 (demonstrating 
the increased jail time for disorderly conduct). 
66 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 46 (advancing the rarity of a false positive). 
67 Id. 
68 See Randy James, A Brief History of DNA Testing, TIME (June 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1905706,00.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/FGN7-FZUU (discussing the growth of DNA testing since it began in 1985 and 
how now, forensic testing can determine distinctive patterns in DNA with 99% accuracy); 
see also MD. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2011) (codifying the Maryland statute that covers DNA 
testing and the preservation of scientific evidence). 
69 See infra Part V.B (demonstrating that reliability supports a strong government interest 
argument). 
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such an intrusion.70  Because DNA testing is so reliable, it can play a 
major role in linking an arrestee to a serious crime or a definitive role in 
exonerating someone of that crime.71  The government interest in 
conducting such testing is therefore quite substantial. 
III.  MARYLAND V. KING 
In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested in Maryland for the crime of 
assault in the first degree.72  Under a Maryland statute providing for the 
DNA testing of those about to be detained after being charged with 
certain felonies, King had a sample of his DNA taken.73  The process 
used to obtain the sample involved swabbing King’s cheek with a cotton 
cloth.74  The sample was then entered into CODIS.75  After comparative 
analysis, King’s sample was found to match the DNA found at the scene 
of a 2003 rape.76  Based in part on this sample and another DNA sample 
of King taken later, which also matched the DNA at the rape scene, King 
was subsequently indicted and convicted of rape.77  The Maryland Court 
of Appeals overturned King’s conviction holding that the part of the 
statute authorizing the taking of DNA samples from arrestees violated 
the Fourth Amendment.78  As both federal and state courts were divided 
                                                 
70 See infra Part V.A (discussing the extent of intrusion of DNA testing). 
71 See infra Part VI (illustrating the importance of DNA in both acquittals and 
convictions). 
72 See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013) (describing the nature of 
King’s crime). 
73 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(i) (2009) (requiring that an “individual 
convicted of a felony or a violation of § 6-205 or § 6-206 of the Criminal Law Article shall 
have a DNA sample collected either at the time of sentence or on intake to a correctional 
facility, if the individual is sentenced to a term of imprisonment”); see also King II, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1966 (providing that booking personnel used a sample from King’s cheek pursuant to the 
provision of the Maryland DNA Collection act). 
74 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. 
75 See supra Part II (discussing the testing of DNA and what the testing process entails); 
see also King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (providing that the Combined DNA Index system was 
authorized by Congress and supervised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation).  The 
CODIS system connects DNA laboratories at the local, state, and national level.  Id. 
76 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (providing that King’s identification as the rapist was in part 
a result of a national project to standardize the collection and storage of DNA profiles). 
77 See id. at 1965 (stating that the DNA taken from King was found to match the DNA 
taken from the 2003 Salisbury rape victim and that as a result of the match, King was tried 
and convicted of rape). 
78 See King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 555–56 (Md. 2012) (holding that the 
Maryland DNA Collection act is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment totality of 
the circumstances balancing test). 
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over the constitutionality of such procedures, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in King II.79 
After describing the process by which DNA is taken and tested, the 
reliability of the results and the specifics of the Maryland statute, the 
Court turned to the critical issue of whether the search and seizure of the 
DNA sample satisfied the test for reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment.80  As the Court notes, this test requires balancing the extent 
of the government’s interest in the procedure against the degree of 
intrusion to the individual.81  The Court asserted that the primary 
interest of the government consisted of establishing the identity of the 
arrestee and obtaining the important benefits that flow from verifying 
this identity.82  First, the Court alluded to the importance of identifying 
arrestees to reveal their “public persona” and thus let the police know 
their criminal history.83  Comparing this purpose to the taking of 
fingerprints, the Court said the only difference between DNA samples 
and other means of establishing identity is the “unparalleled accuracy” 
of DNA results.84  The Court then discussed the need to know who the 
arrestee is and his criminal history.85  This is necessary to determine 
where and under what conditions the arrestee should be housed, to 
inform the decision about how dangerous the individual is, and what, if 
any, bail is needed to insure his appearances in court.86  Finally, and 
unfortunately with minimal analysis, the Court credited the use of DNA 
                                                 
79 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1965 (providing that the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled 
that the DNA taken from King’s booking was an unreasonable search of the person). 
80 See id. at 1968–69 (describing that even though the DNA swab procedure presents an 
issue that has not yet been before the Court, the framework for deciding the issue is well 
established under the Fourth Amendment). 
81 Id. at 1970 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see infra Part 
V.A.1 (analyzing the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, 
focusing on physical intrusions). 
82 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (addressing the fact that the legitimate government 
interest served by collecting the DNA is that law enforcement officers must identify the 
persons they take into custody); infra Part VII (providing information regarding the 
primary purpose test and how it relates to the DNA testing of arrestees). 
83 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (providing that the data found in official records is used 
to produce a comprehensive record of the suspect’s criminal history); infra Part VII 
(assessing the primary purpose test and how it relates the DNA testing of arrestees). 
84 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1964 (stating that there is an unparalleled accuracy that DNA 
provides). 
85 See id. at 1971 (discussing that identity encompasses more than simply the name of an 
arrestee); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 192 (2004) 
(stating that in every criminal case it is necessary to know who has been arrested and who 
is being tried); infra Part VII (assessing the primary purpose test and how it relates the 
DNA testing of arrestees). 
86 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1971–74 (providing that a name holds little value in 
comparison to the interest in identifying an individual brought into custody). 
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testing with helping to exonerate people who have been wrongly 
imprisoned for crimes.87  In such circumstances, presumably a DNA 
sample of an arrestee would indicate it was he who committed the crime 
for which the wrong person was imprisoned.88 
The Court weighed what it regarded as a significant government 
interest against the extent of the intrusion resulting from DNA testing.89  
It concluded that the physical intrusion caused by the swabbing of the 
cheek is minor and the privacy intrusion involved was sufficiently 
minimal due to the provisions of the Maryland statute limiting the use of 
the results.90  When combined with the diminished expectation of 
privacy of one arrested based on probable cause of having committed a 
serious crime and about to be confined to a custodial institution, this 
intrusion was, according to the Court, outweighed by the government’s 
needs to conduct the testing.91 
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia, speaking for four justices, said an 
integral part of the Fourth Amendment is that no government searches 
                                                 
87 See id. at 1974 (discussing that in the interest of justice, the identification of an arrestee 
may have the effect of freeing a person wrongfully convicted).  Andrea Roth states in her 
article: 
One might be forgiven, then, for predicting that an opinion upholding 
that law would be an unapologetic paean to the crime-solving virtues 
of DNA databases.  Yet the five-member King majority devotes only 
two sentences to the ability of DNA to solve crimes, and even then, the 
mention is simply of the “salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully 
imprisoned” for an offense linked to an arrestee through a database 
hit. Instead of justifying Maryland's law as a reasonable crime-fighting 
measure, the majority reconceptualizes the law as deploying DNA 
typing as a “routine booking procedure” and focuses exclusively on 
the state's interest in confirming arrestees' identities and determining 
arrestees' criminal history before making bail decisions. 
Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in Law 
Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 295, 296 (2013). 
88 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (discussing that in the interest of justice, the identification 
of an arrestee may have the effect of freeing a person wrongfully convicted). 
89 See id. at 1977 (comparing the intrusion of the DNA sample to the substantial 
governmental interest); infra Part V.A.1 (examining the balancing test for reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment focusing on the extent of the physical intrusion). 
90 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (providing that a buccal swab does not increase the 
indignity of the circumstances surrounding an arrest); see also infra Part V.A.1 (analyzing 
the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment focusing on the extent 
of the physical intrusion). 
91 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (stating that there are significant state interests in 
identifying an individual who is taken into custody); see also infra Part V.B (examining the 
balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment focusing on the nature of 
the government interest); Lauren Deitrich, Comment, Say Aaah!  Maryland v. King Defines 
Reasonable Standard for DNA Searches, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 1095, 1097–99 (2015) (discussing the 
reasonableness of an individual’s diminished expectation of privacy). 
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for evidence of a crime can take place without some form of prior 
suspicion.92  He asserted that the only time the Court had previously 
permitted such searches or seizures was when the primary purpose of 
the government intrusion was other than ordinary crime investigation.93  
Justice Scalia then went on to criticize the Court’s effort to distinguish 
the purpose of DNA testing from ordinary criminal investigation by the 
Court’s characterization of this purpose as “identification.”94  He argued 
that much of what a criminal investigation often involves is 
identification—the issue involved here—when comparing the DNA 
sample of King to that found at the rape scene to determine if he was the 
perpetrator of that crime.95  Justice Scalia then mocked the Court’s claim 
that the DNA samples were necessary to a quick identification of 
arrestees.96  He did so primarily by showing that both the language in 
the enabling statute regarding the purpose for taking the samples and 
the lengthy process by which King’s DNA sample was taken and tested 
rebut this assertion.97  Finally, with respect to the Court’s comparison of 
the use of DNA samples and that of fingerprints, Justice Scalia argued 
that criminal investigation is the primary purpose of obtaining DNA 
samples whereas “fingerprints of arrestees are taken primarily to 
identify them (though that process sometimes solves crimes).”98  The 
                                                 
92  See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (illustrating that the Fourth 
Amendment forbids searching a person when there is no basis for believing that the person 
is guilty of a crime); infra text accompanying notes 93–99 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s 
dissent). 
93 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1981–82 (stating there are instances where the Court has 
permitted searches without individualized suspicion, however, none of those cases include 
a search with the primary purpose of detecting criminal wrongdoing); infra Part V.A.1 
(scrutinizing the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment focusing 
on the extent of the physical intrusion). 
94 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1982–83 (providing that the Court elaborated ways that the 
DNA search served the special interest of identifying King, but instead the purpose of the 
search was to look for evidence that King committed crimes unrelated to his arrest); infra 
Part V.A.1 (assessing the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
focusing on the extent of the physical intrusion). 
95 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1982–83 (elaborating on the ways that the DNA search served 
the special interest of identifying King).  The Court also posed that the purpose of the 
search was to look for evidence that King committed crimes unrelated to his arrest.  Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1983. 
98 Id. at 1987.  The distinction Justice Scalia draws between the purposes of taking 
fingerprints from arrestees and taking their DNA is a dubious one.  Id.  He argues that that 
the primary purpose of taking such fingerprints is to identify the arrestee and apparently 
these samples just happen to solve crimes as well.  King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1982–83.  This 
minimizes the fact both that “fingerprinting is one the oldest methods of investigating a 
crime using science” and that “fingerprints have been the reason for the solving of a vast 
amount of cases.”  How Fingerprinting Improves Criminal Investigations, PORTLAND ST. U., 
available at http://online.ccj.pdx.edu/resources/news-article/how-fingerprinting-
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remainder of this Article addresses the issues discussed in King II and 
others that were either offered minimal treatment or not directly 
addressed in the holding.99 
IV.  PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
One argument that has been made against the DNA testing of 
arrestees relates to the presumption of innocence.100  States and the 
federal government have, for some time, been testing convicted felons to 
determine if their DNA matches the DNA found at crime scenes.101  Such 
testing has been conducted without any requirement that the tested 
individual is suspected of any other crime.102  Both state and federal 
courts have almost universally upheld such testing against claims that it 
violated the Fourth Amendment.103  Some have argued that similar 
testing of those arrested for, but not convicted or not yet convicted of, a 
felony is distinguishable from the testing of convicted felons because the 
                                                                                                             
improves-criminal-investigations/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7Q6A-HLCW; Molly Wolgar et al., Famous Crimes Solved by Fingerprinting, 
FINGERPRINTS!, available at http://fingerprintinggsc.weebly.com/famous-crimes-solved-by-
fingerprinting.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BSB4-29V4. 
99 See infra Parts IV–VII (discussing such sections as the presumption of innocence, 
balancing test for reasonableness, the diminished expectation of privacy, and the primary 
purpose test). 
100 See infra Part IV (elaborating on this presumption). 
101 See generally CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 52 (discussing the process after 
matching DNA with evidence from another crime scene). 
102 See infra notes 148–58 and accompanying text (providing that the collection of DNA 
samples is also used for solving unrelated crimes). 
103 David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial 
Searching”, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 130 (2013); see State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 26 (Md. 
2004) (“[E]very other appellate court we have found dealing with the issue [of DNA 
collection] has upheld the DNA collection statute at issue before it.”); see also Green v. 
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677–79 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the Wisconsin DNA collection law); 
Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 
(upholding the federal DNA collection law); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 
(10th Cir. 2003) (upholding the federal DNA collection law); Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 
420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (preserving the Texas DNA collection law); Roe v. 
Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a DNA statute is constitutional); 
Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Oklahoma DNA 
collection law); Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Kansas 
DNA collection law); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
the Colorado DNA collection law); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305–08 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding a Virginia DNA collection law).  For some federal district courts that have also 
upheld state DNA collection laws, see Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342–44 
(N.D. Ga. 2003), upholding the Georgia DNA collection law, and Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. 
Supp. 583, 588–89 (D. Minn. 1995), upholding the Minnesota collection law. 
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former group is protected by the presumption of innocence.104  In fact, 
the Maryland Court of Appeals decision that was later overturned by the 
Supreme Court used part of this reasoning in its opinion invalidating the 
DNA testing of arrestees.105 
In assessing whether the presumption of innocence should act as a 
barrier against the DNA testing of arrestees, one must look at the 
meaning of the presumption and its connection, if any, to the Fourth 
Amendment and specifically to the expectation of privacy that has come 
to define “search.”106  The Supreme Court defined this well-known and 
accepted principle of American criminal justice as follows—“[t]he 
presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of 
the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal 
charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty.”107  The 
presumption has been applied to various aspects of the criminal trial 
such as the burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and the nature of the instructions 
given to the jury at the end of the trial.108 
The determination regarding the DNA testing of arrestees, however, 
involves issues entirely independent of the above enumerated concerns 
and protections.109 The questions that arise regarding the 
constitutionality of such testing relate to whether the search, seizure, and 
use of the arrestee’s DNA are reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.110  Such reasonableness determinations balance the extent 
and nature of the governmental intrusion against its need and 
                                                 
104 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and 
opinion superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011); see Mario W. v. Kaipio, 228 Ariz. 207, 222 (Ct. 
App. 2011), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (2012) (Norris, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a 
presumption of innocence and that the state failed to justify why it is entitled to invade the 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
105 King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 576 (Md. 2012) (reasoning that if the 
application of the balancing test of the Fourth Amendment results in a close call when 
considering convicted felons, then the balance must tip in favor of the closely held belief of 
the presumption of innocence). 
106 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 515 (1967) (holding that the government agents in 
the case ignored the procedure of antecedent justification).  But see United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (including a discussion of the trespass doctrine); Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (adding government intrusions that constitute 
trespasses undertaken for investigative purposes to the definition of search). 
107 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895). 
108 Id. 
109 Id.; see Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (expanding the inquiry 
to focus on reasonableness). 
110 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (providing that the ultimate measure of constitutionality 
is reasonableness). 
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importance.111  A critical element in assessing the extent of the intrusion 
is a consideration of the expectation of privacy that the subject of the 
intrusion has at the moment the search or seizure is executed.112  As 
discussed below, one’s status in a total custody facility substantially 
diminishes his or her expectation of privacy and, as decisions of the 
Supreme Court involving the rights of inmates detained in custodial 
institutions have made clear, the presumption of innocence in no way 
informs a decision about whether the particular government policy or 
procedure being challenged complies with the Fourth Amendment.113 
In Bell v. Wolfish, the plaintiffs claimed constitutional violations 
stemming from certain conditions of confinement at a New York facility 
designed primarily to house pre-trial detainees.114  The Court noted that 
such detainees maintain certain constitutional rights, although 
diminished, but then uttered a definitive statement regarding the 
relevance of the presumption of innocence to any assessment of these 
rights.115  After describing the purposes of the presumption, the Court 
wrote, “but it has no application to a determination of the rights of a 
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.”116  
This is not to say that conviction of a crime plays no role when assessing 
the expectation of privacy that one has, but only that the presumption of 
innocence plays no role in that assessment, at least where the subject is 
one confined in a total custodial environment.117  The task then is to see 
why conviction for a crime may diminish one’s expectation of privacy 
and whether similar factors apply to one who has not been convicted but 
is in a custodial facility after a criminal arrest. 
The issue in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of 
Burlington was whether the highly intrusive body search of a man about 
to become a pre-trial detainee violated his Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
111 See id. at 1970 (reasoning that applying traditional standards of reasonableness require 
that a court weigh the promotion of a government interest and the degree of which the 
search intrudes on an individual’s privacy). 
112 See infra Parts V & VI (analyzing the balancing test of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment and how it pertains to the diminished expectation of privacy). 
113 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing 
that an inmate in custody retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest); see also infra 
Parts V & VI (analyzing the balancing test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
and how it pertains to the diminished expectation of privacy). 
114 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (providing that the lawsuit was brought as 
a class action to challenge numerous confinement conditions at the Metropolitan 
Correctional Center). 
115 Id. at 535.  “Under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished to an 
adjudication of guilt . . . .”  Id. 
116 Id. at 533. 
117 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 538 (delegating lesser rights to those in custody). 
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constitutional right.118  In concluding that Florence’s rights were not 
violated, the Court analyzed the issues relating to the reasonableness of 
the search under the Fourth Amendment, but never referred to the 
presumption of innocence as affecting the issues in the case.119  In his 
dissent, Justice Breyer argued that a proper balancing test requires 
articulable suspicion to conduct the search because the extent of the 
intrusion was so substantial.120  Interestingly though, as with the 
majority opinion, Justice Breyer never refers to the presumption of 
innocence of a pre-trial detainee as having any bearing on the search 
involved.121 
Neither in its purpose nor in the application of the principle by the 
Supreme Court is there a basis for the argument that the presumption of 
innocence has any bearing on the legality of the taking and the using of 
DNA samples from detained pre-trial arrestees.122 
V.  THE BALANCING TEST FOR REASONABLENESS UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
A. Extent of Intrusion 
The Supreme Court has long regarded reasonableness as the 
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.”123  In assessing the 
reasonableness of any governmental intrusion conducted without 
individualized suspicion that falls within the parameters of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has balanced the extent of the intrusion 
against the government’s need to conduct the search or seizure 
involved.124  Part V examines the extent of the intrusion that occurs when 
an arrestee in a custodial facility is subjected to the taking of a DNA 
                                                 
118 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 
1513 (2012) (deciding the issue of whether every detainee who will be admitted to the 
general population may be required to undergo a visual inspection while undressed); infra 
Part V.A (discussing the balancing test of reasonableness in greater detail). 
119 See Florence, 132 S. Ct at 1523 (holding that the government struck a reasonable 
balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institution). 
120 See id. at 1528 (reasoning that there are strong justifications on both sides of the 
argument). 
121 See id. (illustrating the omission). 
122 King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 582 (Md. 2012) (Barbera, J., dissenting) 
(providing the majority’s stance on King’s privacy interest). 
123 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 
(1991)); see also Shane Crotty, Note, The Aerial Dragnet:  A Drone-ing Need for Fourth 
Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L REV. 219, 221 (2014) (“The Amendment codified the sacred 
common law right to be secure in one’s own person, free from arbitrary and oppressive 
government intrusion.”). 
124 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
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sample that is then compared with DNA samples found at crime 
scenes.125  This examination is based on the factors previously 
enumerated by the Supreme Court that bear on the extent of a Fourth 
Amendment intrusion and are relevant to the acquisition and use of 
DNA samples of arrestees.126  These factors include the degree of 
physical intrusion, the uses to which evidence is put by the government 
and others, and whether there are safeguards in place to insure that the 
search or seizure is not conducted arbitrarily.127  Additionally, courts 
have long regarded whether the subject of the search or seizure has a 
diminished expectation of privacy as a significant factor in assessing the 
extent of government intrusions.128  This examination demonstrates the 
taking and use of DNA from arrestees is a relatively minor intrusion that 
complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment when the 
testing is conducted and limited in a manner consistent with previously 
enumerated values of that amendment. 
1. Physical Intrusion 
Several courts have described the physical intrusion involved in 
obtaining a DNA sample as minimal.129  While it requires entry into the 
body of the subject, the actual process involves contact that is brief, 
painless, and absent any level of real embarrassment.130  As the 
Maryland court in King II described it, the general method for obtaining 
                                                 
125 See infra Part V (discussing the extent of extrusion). 
126 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–71 (2009) (discussing the 
factors); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761–62 (1985) (providing the factors for 
reasonableness); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771–72 (1966) (relaying the factors). 
127 See infra Part V.A.1 (analyzing the extent of the physical intrusion); see also infra Part 
V.A.3 (examining non-arbitrariness). 
128 Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013); State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 
9 (Minn. 2012); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d. 387, 407 (3rd Cir. 2011); State v. Ritter, 
956 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Vt. 2008); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 
1280 (11th Cir. 2005). 
129 See, e.g., King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1977 (demonstrating the intrusion of a cheek swab is a 
minimal one); Johnson, 813 N.W.2d at 9 (conveying that a buccal swab inside the cheek to 
acquire a DNA sample is a minimal intrusion); Mitchell, 652 F.3d. at 407 (providing that the 
act of collecting DNA is minimal); State v. Ritter, 956 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Vt. 2008) (indicating 
DNA sample taken by buccal swab is a minimal intrusion); Banks, 490 F.3d at 1189 
(showing blood and saliva tests impose minimal intrusions); Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924 
(illustrating that obtaining DNA sample involves minimal intrusion); Padgett, 401 F.3d at 
1280 (stating that taking prisoners’ saliva samples involves a minor intrusion). 
130 In approving the drug and alcohol testing of those railway personnel involved in 
certain accidents, the Court noted the significance of the fact that such testing was 
conducted “outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconvenience or 
embarrassment.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989). 
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the DNA sample is for “the collector to swab up-and-down and rotate a 
sterile cotton swab on the interior of the cheek in the subject’s mouth, 
with enough pressure to remove cells[; the] process is repeated on the 
other cheek with a separate cotton swab.”131  When the Supreme Court 
approved the more intrusive procedure of removing blood through 
piercing the skin with a hypodermic needle, albeit with probable cause, 
in Schmerber v. California, it noted that “for most people the procedure 
involves virtually no risk, trauma[,] or pain.”132  When the Court 
prohibited a bullet removal surgery sought in Winston v. Lee, it described 
the physical intrusion from the surgery as “severe.”133  Similarly, in 
Safford Unified School District Number 1 v. Redding, the Court determined 
that the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment was violated by 
the strip search of a thirteen-year-old middle school student based on the 
articulable suspicion that she possessed a prohibited pain pill, and the 
Court held this way because the intrusion was “embarrassing, 
frightening and humiliating.”134  When applying the emerging factors 
from Schmerber, Lee, and Safford to assess the degree of physical intrusion, 
it is obvious that taking a swab from the interior cheek, the method used 
often with arrestees and the one used in King II, is far less of a physical 
intrusion than the taking of blood, surgery to remove bullets, or strip 
searching a middle school student.135  Obtaining DNA samples involves 
no “risk, trauma[,] or pain.”136  While there is some entry into the body 
when taking a DNA swab from an inner cheek, there is no piercing of 
skin as when a blood sample is taken.137  As one judge put it in 
comparing the physical nature of the intrusion involved in the taking of 
blood with that of buccal swabbing for DNA: 
If the subcutaneous removal of blood from a person's 
veins presents only a marginal intrusion into that 
person's privacy interest, a fortiori the insertion of a 
cotton swab into a person's mouth is less of an intrusion 
and fairly characterized as de minimis.  Unlike the 
process of drawing blood, performing a buccal swab 
                                                 
131 King v. Maryland, 42 A.3d 549, 553 n.5 (Md. 2012). 
132 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). 
133 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985). 
134 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009). 
135 Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013); United States v. Mitchell, 652 
F.3d. 387, 407 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
136 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (wherein the Court referred to these factors as significant 
in determining the reasonableness of the intrusion involved). 
137 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (noting that buccal swab is a far more gentle process); see 
also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (comparing breathalizer tests to blood tests). 
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does not require skin to be pierced, or a hard, foreign 
object to be situated inside of the body.138 
This is not to say that the Court’s holdings in Schmerber, Lee, and Safford 
control the Fourth Amendment acceptability of obtaining DNA samples 
from arrestees. 
The Fourth Amendment intrusion in the taking of DNA samples 
from arrestees is not predicated on the probable cause that was present 
in Schmerber and Lee or the reasonable suspicion existing in Safford, but 
all are instructive regarding the factors that determine the extent of a 
physical intrusion for purposes of deciding their reasonableness under 
the Fourth Amendment.139 
Other factors identified by the Court for assessing the overall 
reasonableness of a bodily intrusion are additional evidence that DNA 
swabbing is an acceptable practice for Fourth Amendment purposes.140  
In Schmerber, the Court observed that the intrusion was reasonable in 
part because the test was effective at showing the amount of alcohol in 
the arrestee’s blood.141  Similarly, the ability to identify someone by 
comparing samples found at a crime scene to those known to belong to a 
certain individual is now widely accepted by courts.142  Another factor 
used to assess the reasonableness of an intrusion for Fourth Amendment 
purposes is the uncertainty of the risk involved in obtaining evidence.143  
The Court in Lee noted how this uncertainty regarding surgery to 
remove bullets from the body reduced the reasonableness of the 
intrusion.144  There is of course no such risk in the taking of DNA swabs 
                                                 
138 King v. Maryland (King II), 42 A.3d 549, 583 (Md. 2012) (Barbera, J., dissenting). 
139 Commentators have noted the relative non-intrusive nature of swabbing the cheek for 
DNA samples.  See, e.g., Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to 
Familial DNA Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 152 (2009) (describing 
buccal swabbing as “perhaps the least intrusive of all seizures”); see also Amy H. Walker, 
Collection of Genomic DNA by Buccal Swabs for Polymerase Chain Reaction-Based on Biomarker 
Assays, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 517, 520 (1999) (discussing benefits of buccal swab 
tests and steps for optimizing PCR success). 
140 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980. 
141 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. 
142 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (“The DNA collected from arrestees is an irrefutable 
identification of the person from whom it was taken.”); see also Dist. Attorney’s Office v. 
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009) (discussing DNA’s power to prove innocence); Diggs v. 
State, 73 A.3d 306, 318 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (exploring the ability to match DNA to a 
suspect with near certainty). 
143 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 (1985) (elaborating on the element of uncertainty). 
144 After examining in detail the risk of harm to the defendant of the bullet removal 
surgery in question, the Court concluded that, “the very uncertainty militates against 
finding the operation to be ‘reasonable.’”  Id. at 766. 
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from the cheeks of arrestees.145  Finally, when the Court approved the 
suspicionless drug testing in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives 
Association, it noted that the procedure for obtaining the urine samples 
there may be performed safely outside a hospital environment.146  This is 
true as well for the use of buccal swabs in obtaining DNA samples from 
arrestees.147 
2. Uses of DNA Evidence 
In addition to the nature of the physical act involved when the 
government conducts a search or seizure, the extent of the overall 
intrusion on one’s privacy is affected as well by the uses to which that 
evidence is put.148  In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court examined 
the reasonableness of drug testing involving a physical intrusion similar 
to the type it had found reasonable in previous cases.149  The Court 
regarded the drug testing in Ferguson as a greater intrusion than in the 
previous cases because in those cases, “there was no misunderstanding 
about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results, and 
there were protections against the dissemination of the results to third 
parties.”150 
Statutes that permit the DNA testing of arrestees should be limited 
in their uses.151  The subjects should be notified of the purposes of the 
test and, most importantly, the DNA should not be used for purposes 
that go beyond identifying the subject and comparing the sample taken 
from the arrestee to DNA samples found at the scenes of serious 
crimes.152  The Maryland statute at issue in King I limits the use of DNA 
samples taken from arrestees to the “identification” of the subject.153  
                                                 
145 See, e.g., Walker, supra note 139, at 520 (describing buccal swabbing as a relatively 
noninvasive means of obtaining DNA “that pose[s] lowered risk for both the subject and 
laboratory personnel”). 
146 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989). 
147 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968. 
148 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002). 
149 Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).  The Court looked at the drug testing it 
had found reasonable in Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.  Compare Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 665 (1995), and Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989), 
with Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (illustrating circumstances where the 
Supreme Court had found the testing unreasonable). 
150 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). 
151 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (2003) (limiting the use of DNA 
records); id. § 2-505(b)(2) (providing restrictions on the use of DNA samples). 
152 Id. § 2-505. 
153 Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013).  “Only DNA records that 
directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.”  MD. CODE 
ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1). 
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This includes the use of the DNA sample for comparative purposes but 
forbids any other use.154  In fact, the statute provides for criminal 
sanctions for anyone improperly using the samples or disseminating 
them to third parties.155  Additionally, the Maryland statute prohibits the 
kind of testing that would reveal intimate details about the subject.156  As 
the judge who dissented to the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in 
King II noted, the statute there “effectively restricts the testing of DNA to 
the [thirteen] loci specified by the FBI and CODIS[,] . . . [t]hese specific 
codi are non-coding; ‘in other words, the genetic material at these 
locations is not known to determine a human attribute such as height, 
weight, or susceptibility to a particular disease.’”157  In sum, this means 
the loci involved in such testing, sometimes called “junk DNA,” “cannot 
reveal any genetic information about an arrestee, other than that the 
arrestee is identifiably different from other members of the human 
race.”158 
In distinguishing DNA testing from the use of fingerprints, the state 
court majority opinion in King II noted that broad DNA testing, unlike 
fingerprints, could reveal intimate details about an individual, what is 
referred to as a “genetic treasure map.”159  This is certainly true, 
however, given the restrictions in the Maryland statute and the 
impossibility of revealing such details except by violating the law—it 
seems the Maryland court was overly concerned with possible future 
misuse of the samples.160  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit wrote in United States v. Pool: 
But beyond the fact that the DNA Act itself provides 
protections against such misuse, our job is limited to 
resolving the constitutionality of the program before us, 
as it is designed and as it has been implemented.  In our 
                                                 
154 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-505(a)(2) & (b)(2). 
155 “A person who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding [five] years or a 
fine not exceeding [$5000] or both.”  Id. § 2-512(e).  “A person who violates subsection (d) 
of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not 
exceeding [one] year or a fine not exceeding [$1000].”  Id. § 2-512(f). 
156 “All personal identifiers shall be removed before information is entered into the 
population data base.”  Id. § 2-509(b). 
157 King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 584 (Md. 2012). 
158 Id. at 585; see H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (“[G]enetic markers used for 
forensic DNA testing were purposely selected because they are not associated with any 
known physical or medical characteristics.”); see also CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 
52 (discussing the type of information stored in CODIS DNA databases). 
159 King I, 42 A.3d at 577; United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010). 
160 See King I, 42 A.3d at 578 (finding DNA to encompass a heightened security threat). 
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system of government, courts base decisions not on 
dramatic Hollywood fantasies, . . . but on concretely 
particularized facts developed in the cauldron of the 
adversary process and reduced to an assessable record.  
If, . . . and when, some future program permits the 
parade of horribles the DNA Act’s opponents fear—
unregulated disclosure of CODIS profiles to private 
parties, genetic discrimination, state-sponsored 
eugenics . . .—we have every confidence that courts will 
respond appropriately.161 
The possibility of overreaching can never be eliminated, but it is 
unreasonable to negate an otherwise acceptable government activity 
when both science and law substantially limit that possibility.162 
Courts have universally permitted DNA testing of convicted 
criminals where this same slim possibility of misuse exists.163  Even 
accepting the proposition that the expectation of privacy for one 
convicted of a crime is less than one arrested, but still presumed to be 
innocent, it is difficult to see why this difference would allow DNA 
testing of convicts if there was a serious risk that such testing could 
reveal the “genetic treasure map” alluded to above.164  It is crucial 
therefore to limit the use of the DNA samples taken from arrestees in a 
manner similar to the way this is accomplished under the Maryland 
statute.165  This includes a limit on the kind of genetic material tested and 
severe penalties for anyone who reveals any information from the testing 
that is not authorized by the statute.166 
3. Non-arbitrariness 
The Supreme Court long ago established the principle that for 
intrusions into areas protected by the Fourth Amendment that take place 
without individualized suspicion, the reasonableness of such intrusions 
depends to a significant degree on the amount of discretion that 
individual government officials have in executing the searches or 
                                                 
161 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1221–22 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837–38 (9th 
Cir. 2004)). 
162 Id. at 1238. 
163 See supra notes 148–58 and accompanying text (discussing the law surrounding DNA 
collection). 
164 King I, 42 A.3d at 577. 
165 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (2011) (limiting DNA searches to only 
identification purposes). 
166 Id. § 2-512(e). 
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seizures in question.167  The more discretion a search or seizure involves, 
the more intrusive it is, and this enhanced intrusiveness weighs against 
the reasonableness of the procedure for Fourth Amendment purposes.168  
Although the objective physical intrusion of two procedures may be 
similar, the fact that one allows the police greater discretion regarding 
whom to search increases the anxiety of the individual and therefore the 
subjective degree of the intrusion.169 
Searches or seizures conducted without individualized suspicion at 
the discretion of officers in the field can be arbitrary or discriminatory, 
and a search that is either of these would conflict with Fourth 
Amendment principles.170  In contrast, the regularity of a government 
search or seizure avoids the kind of randomness and arbitrariness 
against which the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect.171  For 
example, in assessing the constitutionality of border area automobile 
seizures designed to detect smugglers of undocumented aliens that were 
conducted without individualized suspicion, the Court allowed them 
when done at a checkpoint stopping all cars but not when done by 
officers in the field making individual decisions about which cars to 
stop.172  In permitting the inspection of automobile parts dealerships 
without individualized suspicion, one of the criteria used by the Court in 
determining the reasonableness of such inspections was the systematized 
                                                 
167 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (“warrantless searches devolves 
almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers”); see also United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (demonstrating that warrantless searches must be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 
U.S. 72, 74 (1970) (conveying that warrantless searches are permitted under certain 
circumstances). 
168 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312. 
169 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557–58 (1976). 
170 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (affirming the importance of imposing limitations on government 
officials). 
171 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 314. 
172 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 
(1973); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653–54.  The Supreme Court prohibited the suspicionless stops of 
individual cars to check for drivers licenses and registration, and the Court stated, “[t]he 
essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 
‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law 
enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions.’”  Id.; see Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882 (limiting police discretion in 
patrol stops).  Similarly, when it approved the use of sobriety checkpoints to apprehend 
and deter intoxicated drivers, the Court noted the reduced level of the subjective intrusion 
resulting from the fact that in stopping all the cars that approached the checkpoints, the 
police exercised no discretion.  Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452–53 
(1990). 
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nature of the inspection scheme and how it largely removed discretion 
from those conducting the inspections.173 
Particularly noteworthy regarding the significance of discretion in 
searches or seizures of individuals performed without individualized 
suspicion is the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Samson v. 
California and the manner in which the majority opinion responded to 
it.174  Justice Stevens criticized the decision in Samson, which allowed 
police unlimited discretion to search parolees without any 
individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.175  He asserted that 
previous Supreme Court decisions have dispensed with individualized 
suspicion in special needs cases where “programmatic safeguards [are] 
designed to ensure evenhandedness in application,” and that “if 
individualized suspicion is to be jettisoned, it must be replaced with 
measures to protect against the state actor’s unfettered discretion.”176  
Justice Stevens argued that the California statute at issue contained no 
such limiting policies “to rein in officers and furnish a bulwark against 
the arbitrary exercise of discretion that is the height of 
unreasonableness.”177  The response to Justice Stevens’ argument from 
the majority disputed his claim that the statute allowed for unbridled 
discretion because of California case law and statutory prohibitions that 
generally disallow arbitrary and capricious searches.178  Dubious as the 
majority’s response here might be, it is noteworthy that the Court did not 
dispute Stevens’ assertion that were these intrusions too discretionary, 
they would be unreasonable.179 
Regardless of whether one accepts Samson’s majority view that 
discretion was effectively limited in a search, notwithstanding the fact 
that virtually any parolees could be searched and seized without 
                                                 
173 The Supreme Court wrote:   
The statute’s inspection program in terms of the certainty and 
regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally 
adequate substitute for a warrant.  In other words, the regulatory 
statute must perform the two basic function of a warrant:  it must 
advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being 
made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it 
must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers. 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987). 
174 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 859 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 860. 
177 Id. at 860–61. 
178 Id. at 856. 
179 “The concern that California’s suspicionless search system gives officers unbridled 
discretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that arouse strong 
resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate into productive society, is 
belied by California’s prohibition on ‘arbitrary, capricious or harassing’ searches.”  Id.  
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individualized suspicion under California’s enabling statute, the contrast 
with DNA testing of arrestees under an appropriately limiting law, such 
as that in Maryland, is stark.180  The Maryland statute requires that 
everyone arrested for certain crimes and in police custody must have a 
DNA sample obtained in the same manner and put to the same uses as 
all others in the same group.181  Virtually no discretion or arbitrariness is 
permitted regarding the nature of the intrusion here, and thus on this 
issue, the search and seizure under the Maryland DNA statute is far less 
intrusive than the search approved by the Court in Samson.182  It is hardly 
surprising then that the King II Court found that the relatively discretion-
free nature of the Maryland DNA testing procedure weighed heavily in 
determining its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.183 
The extent of the intrusion is one of two integral parts of the 
balancing test used to determine the reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment of personal searches and seizures conducted without 
individualized suspicion.184  The obtaining and use of DNA samples 
taken from arrestees detained in custodial facilities, when authorized 
under protective statutes such as the one at issue in King II, is a relatively 
minor intrusion under the standards applied by the Supreme Court.185  
The process of the sample taking involves a safe, brief, non-harmful, and 
minimally intrusive physical act.186  The taking is conducted in a 
standardized non-arbitrary manner and is risk-free.187  Finally, when 
strong protections against improper use and dissemination of the results 
of the testing are included within the authorizing statute, the extent of 
the intrusion is even more minimal.188 
B. Nature of Government Interest 
The next step in the balancing process then is to assess the extent of 
the government interest in taking and testing DNA samples of 
                                                 
180 Maryland v. King (King I), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013).  See generally Samson, 547 U.S. at 
856 (providing the Court’s holding). 
181 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (2011). 
182 Compare King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1964 (concluding that an intrusion of a cheek swab to 
obtain a DNA sample is minimal), with Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (confirming that 
suspicionless search of parolee does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
183 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 
(1989)). 
184 Id. at 1977. 
185 Id. at 1980; see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (allotting reduced protection 
to those in custody). 
186 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1964. 
187 Id. at 1970. 
188 Id. at 1967. 
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arrestees.189  DNA evidence when obtained and tested through accepted 
means is very reliable.190  It can establish to a near mathematical certainty 
that someone was present at a certain location or at some point 
possessed a certain object.191  Crime solving techniques of far less 
reliability are used by police in solving crimes and permitted by courts in 
adjudicating them.192  Evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, attests to 
the importance of DNA evidence in helping to convict those guilty of 
serious crimes and exonerate those who are innocent.193  No more 
important purpose exists for the use of evidence or for that matter for 
our system of criminal justice. 
DNA evidence has been used to help apprehend those guilty of 
recent crimes and to solve cold cases, often thought to be insolvable.194  
DNA samples were often times not available from the scenes of past 
serious crimes.195  Now it is standard procedure in many police 
departments to seek DNA samples from the scenes of serious crimes just 
as looking for fingerprints or other physical evidence is part of crime 
                                                 
189 See id. at 1962 (discussing government interest). 
190 See Julie E. Samuels et al., Collecting DNA at Arrest:  Policies, Practices, and Implications, 
URBAN INST. (May 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412831-
Collecting-DNA-at-Arrest-Policies-Practices-and-Implications-Report.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BJ2V-2DHH (providing a background of DNA collections and policies 
regarding arrests). 
191 Id. 
192 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. 
REV. 13, 63 (2001) (comparing fingerprint evidence to DNA evidence). 
193 See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php, archived 
at http://perma.cc/GU76-CNE2 (discussing DNA exonerations for people wrongfully 
convicted of crimes); CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 52 (discussing the CODIS and 
NDIS facts).  In assessing the manner in which criminal investigations are aided by the use 
of DNA comparisons, the FBI reports that the National DNA Index (“NDIS”) contains over 
11,015,147 offender profiles, 1,922,415 arrestee profiles, and 565,159 forensic profiles as of 
June 2014.  Id.  Ultimately, the success of the CODIS program will be measured by the 
crimes it helps to solve.  Id.  CODIS’s primary metric, the “Investigation Aided,” tracks the 
number of criminal investigations where CODIS has added value to the investigative 
process.  Id.  As of June 2014, CODIS has produced over 250,809 hits assisting in more than 
239,317 investigations.  Id. 
194 See infra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing how DNA evidence has helped 
exonerate wrongfully convicted individuals). 
195 See Non-DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/non-dna-exonerations.php, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L564-V8P8 (discussing how individuals have been exonerated by other 
means besides DNA evidence). 
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scene investigation.196  We can, therefore, expect that many more crimes 
than in the past may be solved through the use of DNA evidence.197 
Collecting DNA from arrestees expands the number of people whose 
samples can be compared to those found at crime scenes and should 
increase the number of crimes solved through DNA hits.198  If the extent 
of intrusion to the individual arrested for a serious felony is minor, as 
discussed above, this important government interest satisfies the test for 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and should be 
permitted.199 
There are many accounts of DNA evidence being used to link people 
to awful crimes.200  For example, DNA testing was used to identify and 
eventually convict the infamous “Green River Killer” who raped and 
murdered dozens of women in the Seattle-Tacoma area in the 1980s and 
1990s.201  In 2001, forensic investigators decided to re-examine evidence 
compiled years before with two new modes of DNA analysis and found 
that a sample of semen left on a victim matched Gary Ridgway’s DNA.202  
Confronted with the weight of this evidence, Ridgeway pled guilty and 
was sentenced to forty-eight consecutive life sentences with no 
possibility of parole.203 
                                                 
196 See Samuels, supra note 190 (discussing the DNA collection practice at arrests). 
197 See Jay Siegel & Susan D. Narveson, Why Arrestee DNA Legislation Can Save Indiana 
Taxpayers over $60 Million Per Year (Jan. 2009), available at http://dnasaves.org/files/ 
IN_DNA_Cost_Savings_Study.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5VPM-KSCQ (discussing 
an anticipated increase in solved crimes). 
198 Id. 
199 See supra Part V.A (discussing the extent of intrusion of DNA testing). 
200  See Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology:  Using DNA to Solve Crimes, U.S. DEP’T 
JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/advancing-justice-through-
dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes, archived at http://perma.cc/MG7M-EQE9 (“In 
1999, New York authorities linked a man through DNA evidence to at least [twenty-two] 
sexual assaults and robberies that had terrorized the city.  In 2002, authorities in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Fort Collins, Colorado, used DNA evidence to link and 
solve a series of crimes (rapes and a murder) perpetrated by the same individual.”); P. 
Solomon Banda, Police Use DNA to Solve Property Crimes, NBC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27284393/ns/technology_and_science-science 
/t/police-use-dna-solve-property-crimes/#.U9pyAo1dU7p, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Y2YG-8UN4 (“RazJohn Smyer, a suspect in a string of Denver-area break-ins, often 
checked his victims' refrigerators and helped himself to a drink.  The soda cans he left 
behind gave police enough DNA evidence to link him to five burglaries.  He's now serving 
a [twenty]-year sentence.”). 
201 See Elizabeth Svoboda, Cold Case is Closed by DNA Match:  Green River Killer, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/science/12file-
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Of additional significance are those cases in which DNA evidence 
not only links individuals to crimes but where it also exonerates those 
who have been charged or convicted of those crimes.204  For nearly thirty 
years, Erie County, New York, was terrorized by a man who came to be 
known as the “Bike Path Rapist.”205  Anthony Capozzi, the man who was 
believed to be responsible for the rapes and murder of three women 
committed by the Bike Path Rapist, was convicted in 1984 of two of the 
rapes based on eyewitness identification and sentenced to twenty–five 
years in prison.206  However, while Capozzi was in prison, additional 
rapes and murders took place.207  Those murders were incredibly similar 
to prior rapes and murders, including the two for which Capozzi was 
incarcerated.208  The final murder took place on a local bike path in 2006 
and a task force was formed to investigate the crime.209  Ultimately, 
Altemio Sanchez’s DNA was collected from a water glass in a restaurant 
and found to match the DNA profile from a drop of sweat found in the 
last victim’s car.210  While all the evidence from Capozzi’s trial had been 
destroyed after his appeal was denied, forensic DNA tests of the clinical 
slides still maintained at the hospital of the two victims for which 
Capozzi had been convicted matched the DNA profile of Altemio 
Sanchez.211  Using DNA, prosecutors linked Sanchez to at least eight 
other attacks, including the two for which Capozzi was convicted.212  In 
2007, after serving twenty–two years in prison, Capozzi was exonerated 
and Sanchez pled guilty to the murder of three women.213 
In addition to the Capozzi case, the Innocence Project lists 321 cases 
where DNA evidence was instrumental in showing wrongful 
convictions.214  Twenty of those cases involved people who were on 
death row.215  In Maryland, the state from where the King II case 
                                                 
204 See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204 (demonstrating the amount of 
individuals exonerated by DNA evidence). 
205 Carolyn Thompson, Buffalo’s Bike Path Rapist Sentenced, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2007, 
12:11 AM), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
08/14/AR2007081400904.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A3HB-2ST8. 
206 DNA Case Highlights, N.Y. STATE DIV. CRIM. JUSTICE SERVS., 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/dnacasehighlights.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 
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emanates, the most famous case is that of Kirk Bloodsworth.216  
Bloodsworth was convicted of the rape and murder of a nine-year-old 
girl in a brutal 1984 crime.217  He was convicted based on an idento-
sketch, which looked like him, and the testimony of five eyewitnesses 
claiming to have seen Bloodsworth with the victim.218  It was the 
discovery and comparison of DNA found on the clothing of the victim 
that ultimately exonerated Bloodsworth and pointed to the man who 
had actually raped and murdered Dawn Hamilton.219  Until DNA 
evidence freed him, Kirk Bloodsworth served more than eight years in 
prison, two on death row, for a crime he did not commit.220 
One of the most notorious wrongful convictions occurred in what 
became known as the Central Park Jogger Case.221  Based in part on the 
confessions of some of them, five men were convicted of raping a 
woman as she jogged through New York’s Central Park.222  Only after 
some of the men served more than a decade in prison did another man 
confess to the crime.223  It was, however, the fact that his DNA matched 
that of the semen found in the victim that made absolutely clear that 
those serving time for the crime had to be released.224  DNA evidence is 
crucial in such a case because many are unwilling to exculpate someone 
convicted of a crime based on the word of another criminal.225  Nothing 
                                                 
216 See Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-
false-imprisonment/kirk-bloodsworth (last visited Apr. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q7BD-W5H2 (providing information regarding Kirk Bloodsworth and 
his 1985 conviction). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 See id. (establishing Bloodsworth’s innocence and exoneration based on DNA). 
220 Id. 
221 See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in the ’89 Central Park Jogger 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/20/ 
nyregion/convictions-and-charges-voided-in-89-central-park-jogger-attack.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L8KU-U3QX (attributing the exoneration of five young men in a savage 
beating to DNA evidence). 
222 Id. 
223 See id. (explaining that another man, Matias Reyes, confessed to raping the New York 
woman). 
224 See Robert D. McFadden, Boys’ Guilt Likely in Rape of Jogger, Police Panel Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://condemnationofblackness.voices.wooster.edu/ 
files/2013/10/BOYS-GUILT-LIKELY-IN-RAPE-OF-JOGGER-POLICE-PANEL-SAYS-New-
York-Times.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8HFL-5RV4 (establishing DNA as the reason 
the convicted man had to be released).  Michael Armstrong, one of the authors of a NYC 
Police Department report on the case, said “the panel did not dispute the legal necessity of 
setting aside the convictions of the five defendants based on the new DNA evidence that 
Mr. Reyes had raped the jogger.”  Id. 
225 Id. (quoting Armstrong, “we think the word of a serial rapist killer is not something to 
be heavily relied upon”). 
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contaminates the criminal justice system more than when innocent 
people are convicted of crimes.226  The ability of DNA evidence to 
exonerate such people has been demonstrated and is an integral 
component of the government’s interest in expanding their DNA sample 
list with the specimens of those arrested and incarcerated for serious 
crimes.227  The Capozzi, Bloodsworth and Central Park Jogger cases 
show how identification testimony and confessions, two types of 
evidence that lead to lots of convictions, can be incorrect and that such 
mistakes can result in tragic consequences.228  It is hard to imagine the 
injustices that would result in these cases had they not been corrected 
with DNA evidence.229 
For the government interest to be substantial regarding the taking of 
DNA samples from those arrested for serious crimes, there must be a 
specific benefit derived from obtaining the samples upon arrest and not 
depending on a conviction before doing so.230  Studies indicate that such 
a benefit is in fact present.231  This benefit accrues both through 
apprehending the actual perpetrators of past violent crimes and, in 
doing so, preventing future crimes by imprisoning the individuals before 
they can re-offend.232  For example, a Virginia study found that between 
                                                 
226 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating the goal of the criminal 
justice system is to see “that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer”).  What is famously 
known as Blackstone’s formulation makes the same point differently, “[i]t is better that ten 
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”  Words of Justice, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR., 
http://library.law.harvard.edu/justicequotes/explore-the-room/south-4/ (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4RXE-Z4QL. 
227 DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204. 
228 See Bloodsworth, supra note 216 (illustrating that Bloodsworth spent years on death row 
for a crime he did not commit). 
229 See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204 (conveying the success of DNA in 
exonerating those wrongfully convicted). 
230 See infra Part VII (elaborating on the primary purpose test). 
231 Arrestees, DNA FORENSICS, http://www.dnaforensics.com/Arrestees.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SD5D-YXY7; Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra 
note 190; DENVER’S STUDY ON PREVENTABLE CRIMES, DENV. DIST. ATT’YS OFF., available at 
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Arrestee_Database/Denver%20Preventable
%20Crime%20Study1.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4Z46-
89NG; Maryland Study on Preventable Crimes, MD. CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. SYS., available at 
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4GTL-N5NM. 
232 In its assessment of DNA testing of arrestees, the Urban Institute reported that: 
Research demonstrates that a considerable number of individuals will 
commit multiple crimes, suggesting that collecting DNA from repeat 
offenders could assist law enforcement in solving crimes.  Proponents 
of arrestee DNA laws recognize that certain individuals who are 
arrested but not convicted for a qualifying offense have committed 
crimes (or will commit future crimes) for which there might be forensic 
evidence.  Even those who are ultimately convicted may remain in the 
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2003 and 2009, the DNA testing of arrestees resulted in 559 “hits,” 
eighty-nine of which were associated with sexual offense cases.233  A 
Maryland study of just three offenders concluded that had their DNA 
been obtained upon their arrest for a serious crime, twenty crimes could 
have been prevented.234  The DNA sampling of arrestees obtained under 
the Maryland law at issue in King II from 2009 through 2013 resulted in 
303 “hits,” ninety-three arrests, and sixty-one convictions.235  A study 
done by the District Attorney’s Office in Denver concluded that had the 
DNA of just five people arrested for felonies been taken upon their 
arrest, forty–seven violent crimes, including three murders and eighteen 
sexual assaults, could have been prevented.236 
There are many reasons why arrests do not lead to convictions, some 
related to whether the individual actually committed the crime for which 
he has been arrested and many that do not.237  If the use of DNA 
comparisons were limited to only those convicted of crimes, a critically 
important investigative tool might be delayed or lost entirely.238  For 
those who have not been convicted after arrest, statutes, such as the 
Maryland one at issue in the King II case, appropriately require 
                                                                                                             
community between their arrest and conviction, which could provide 
an opportunity for additional criminal offending before DNA can be 
collected, analyzed, and used to establish guilt.  The expansion of 
offender databases to include arrestees seeks to remedy this gap by 
identifying new suspects in a criminal investigation and resolving 
cases faster.  Proponents of arrestee DNA frequently cite averted crime 
as a short- and long-term outcome.  Based on findings from their cost-
benefit analysis of proposed arrestee DNA legislation in Indiana, 
Siegel and Narveson (2009) concluded, “with an arrestee law in place, 
the first time [a criminal] is arrested he will be linked to his long record 
of anonymous violent crimes, and can be removed from the population 
and the opportunity to do further harm—saving the government’s cost 
to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate those prevented crimes.”  In 
their retrospective case studies exploring the criminal trajectories of 
known criminals, several jurisdictions have arrived at the same 
conclusion as Siegel and Narveson, arguing that if DNA had been 
collected earlier in the individuals’ criminal careers, crimes may have 
been prevented. 
Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra note 190, at 7. 
233 Arrestees, supra note 231. 
234 Maryland Study on Preventable Crimes, supra note 231. 
235 See Arrestees, supra note 231 (showing the total number of “hits”, arrests, and 
convictions between 2009 and 2013 for charged offenders). 
236 DENVER’S STUDY ON PREVENTABLE CRIMES, supra note 231. 
237 See Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra note 190, at iii (discussing how many arrests do not 
lead to convictions). 
238 See supra note 204 (addressing the results of several studies, which indicate the 
significance of a DNA database in exonerations). 
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expungement of those samples.239  Therefore, with regard to those who 
have been arrested for serious crimes but not subsequently convicted, 
their DNA is on file only for the time between arrest and disposition of 
their case.240  Assuming again that the sample is used only to identify the 
arrestee and to see if he has been involved in other serious crimes, the 
intrusion to his privacy rights would seem minimal compared to the 
government’s need to successfully investigate and solve those crimes, 
particularly if others have been wrongfully charged with or convicted of 
those crimes.241  This is especially true when considering how the success 
of criminal investigations can be compromised by delays in obtaining 
crucial evidence.242 
VI.  DIMINISHED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
The previous section of this Article analyzed the extent of the 
intrusion involved when the government obtains a DNA sample from a 
buccal swab taken from an arrestee in a custodial institution.243  This 
intrusion also includes the uses to which a sample is put, specifically to 
confirm the identity of the subject and to link the subject to serious 
crimes.244  In assessing the degree to which such an intrusion factors into 
the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment, courts must also take into consideration whether the 
subject of the intrusion has a diminished expectation of privacy.245  Such 
a diminished expectation allows for government searches and seizures 
that might not otherwise be considered reasonable under the Fourth 
                                                 
239 See MD. PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (2011) (explaining that DNA samples may be destroyed if 
the individual is not convicted after arrest). 
240 See Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra note 190, at 1 (stating that DNA specimens are 
collected from an individual following an arrest but before case disposition). 
241 See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204 (illustrating exonerations of those 
wrongfully convicted). 
242 See Nathan James, DNA Testing in Criminal Justice:  Background, Current Law, Grants, 
and Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 8 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/R41800.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AJT7-FAS2 (discussing the problems 
with delays in DNA processing). 
243 See supra Part V (discussing in depth the reasonableness test). 
244  See supra note 2 (discussing various federal and state crimes that require the collection 
of a DNA sample). 
245 See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) (explaining that the 
reasonableness of any search must be considered in the context of that individual’s 
legitimate expectations of privacy); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
654 (1995) (expressing that the nature of privacy interest is the first factor to be considered 
when discussing Fourth Amendment protections); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 
(1987) (stating that an expectation of privacy infringed upon must be reasonable to 
implicate the Fourth Amendment). 
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Amendment.246  Specifically, if a person or business has a diminished 
expectation of privacy, this plays a central role in permitting the 
government to intrude upon areas and interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment without the usual requirements of individualized suspicion 
and a warrant.247  It is incumbent then to examine whether, and to what 
extent, arrestees confined to a total custodial facility have a diminished 
expectation of privacy.  This would then factor significantly into the 
determination of whether DNA samples can be taken from them without 
suspicion and used to determine if they were involved with any other 
crime. 
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions held that a person or 
business with a diminished expectation of privacy is subject to certain 
types of searches and seizures that would not be permitted absent this 
diminished expectation.248  With businesses, this diminished expectation 
comes from the fact that certain facilities, such as coal mines and firearm 
dealerships, are pervasively regulated by the government.249  
                                                 
246 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (illustrating that search warrant 
exceptions exist for businesses with a rich history of government oversight); see also United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (holding that warrantless inspections of firearm 
businesses do not violate the Fourth Amendment); Colonnade Catering Corp v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (acknowledging that reasonableness is viewed differently 
under the Fourth Amendment for areas where the government has broad inspection 
powers). 
247 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (explaining that a warrant and 
probable cause requirements typically required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment 
standards of reasonableness have a lessened application when there is a diminished 
expectation of privacy); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (describing the importance of being able to conduct searches immediately in 
certain situations, such as teaching in a public school, and that requiring evidence for 
probable cause would not allow that immediate search); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315 (contrasting 
the government interest in regulating the liquor industry and the firearm industry to assess 
the expectation of privacy for licensed dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 75–77 
(providing background on government regulation on the liquor industry and explaining 
that the history of heavy government oversight causes a diminished expectation of privacy 
and allows for warrantless inspections). 
248 See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (justifying unannounced, warrantless inspections by 
distinguishing business industries with diminished expectations of privacy); see also Burger, 
482 U.S. at 702 (discussing the significance of “closely regulated” industries that create a 
diminished expectation of privacy and serve as exceptions to the traditional warrant and 
probable cause requirements); Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320 (revealing that entitlement to 
inspection without prior notice can be based on reasonable legislature and administrative 
standards for certain businesses). 
249 See Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 (reasoning that business owners in “closely regulated” 
industries have a diminished privacy expectation because the industries are pervasively 
regulated by the government, and owners have knowledge that their business records and 
other operating conditions may be inspected and heavily regulated); see also Biswell, 406 
U.S. at 316 (demonstrating that an arms dealer knows his business records will be subject to 
inspection when he decides to engage in the pervasively regulated field); Colonnade 
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Accordingly, the owners of such businesses are on notice that their 
premises are subject to government inspections without probable cause 
or specific warrants.250  Regarding searches and seizures of individuals, 
the Supreme Court has held that certain jobs or the overall status of some 
people can result in their having a reduced privacy expectation 
compared to the public at large.251  Probationers, parolees, certain high 
school students, railroad workers involved in accidents, and federal 
employees about to be transferred to positions where they will be 
carrying firearms are among those that have been deemed to possess 
such a diminished expectation of privacy.252 
Some of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding which groups 
have a diminished expectation of privacy are highly questionable.253  For 
example, in justifying various types of searches of automobiles and 
containers within automobiles, the Court relied on what it regarded as 
the diminished expectation of privacy that one has in an automobile.254  
This diminished expectation was said to be due in part to the fact that 
regulations exist regarding the ownership, use, and maintenance of 
                                                                                                             
Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 77 (assessing the pervasiveness of regulations on the liquor 
industry and holding that warrantless searches are permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
250 See, e.g. Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 (stating that firearms dealers, and other business 
owners, that choose to engage in the heavily regulated business, have knowledge that their 
business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to inspection). 
251 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001) (asserting that probationers have 
a diminished expectation of privacy); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) 
(comparing the privacy of a parolee to a probationer and holding that parolees have fewer 
expectations of privacy); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–32 (2002) (finding that a student’s privacy interest is limited in a 
public school environment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985) (holding that 
students still have some privacy interests and those interests are not waived completely by 
simply carrying bags onto school grounds); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
628 (1989) (acknowledging that railroad workers have a diminished expectation of privacy 
as it relates to toxicology testing after work accidents because of the dangerousness 
associated with their occupation); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
672 (1989) (reasoning that federal employees required to carry firearms or work in the 
interdiction of illegal drugs have a diminished expectation of privacy). 
252 See infra notes 248–51 and accompanying text (discussing employees with a 
diminished expectation of privacy). 
253 See infra notes 254–56 and accompanying text (illustrating that those in automobiles 
have a diminished expectation of privacy). 
254 See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (reasoning that the amount of privacy 
expected in an automobile is diminished).  In Chambers v. Maroney, the Supreme Court 
chronicled the development of car searches and seizures.  399 U.S. 42, 49 (1970).  The 
original justification for warrantless searches of vehicles based on probable cause was due 
to the mobility of the automobile.  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925). 
694 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
automobiles.255  Still it is difficult to see, as the Court has held, how 
requiring the registration of automobiles and mandating certain types of 
periodic vehicle inspections results in an individual having less of an 
expectation of privacy in a paper bag locked in the trunk of her car than 
when that same bag is being openly carried in the street.256  In 
sanctioning the suspicionless drug testing of certain high school 
students, the Court found a reduced expectation of privacy in the fact 
that these students participated in extracurricular activities.257  Leaving 
aside the fact that most high school students participate in one or more 
such activities, it is difficult to understand why a fourteen-year-old 
student who joins the chess club or debate society deserves less privacy 
than other students.258  Additionally, it is even harder to imagine that 
students participating in extracurricular activities are, or should be 
                                                 
255 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1973) (relying on the fact that there are 
many existing state and federal laws that govern the ownership and operation of 
automobiles to rationalize the diminished expectation of privacy).  In explaining those 
regulations, the Court in Cady wrote, “[a]ll states require vehicles to be registered and 
operators to be licensed.  States and localities have enacted extensive and detailed codes 
regulating the condition and manner in which motor vehicles may be operated on public 
streets and highways.”  Id. at 441.  Automobiles periodically undergo official inspection, 
and they are often taken into police custody in the interests of public safety.  South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976). 
256 This difficulty was the result of the Court’s holding in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565, 580–81 (1991), and led to Justice Stevens’ comment in his dissent that: 
For surely it is anomalous to prohibit a search of a briefcase while the 
owner is carrying it exposed on a public street yet to permit a search 
once the owner has placed the briefcase in the locked trunk of his car.  
One's privacy interest in one's luggage can certainly not be diminished 
by one's removing it from a public thoroughfare and placing it-out of 
sight-in a privately owned vehicle. 
Id. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 195–96 (4th ed. 
2000).  The authors state: 
The reasons the Court gave in Chadwick for distinguishing the privacy 
interest associated with cars from that associated with other effects do 
not explain why the areas in which evidence is usually found (e.g. 
glove compartments, trunks and so on) are less protected than other 
private areas which house personal property.  More importantly, even 
if the car and its interior do have a diminished aura of privacy, the fact 
should not be relevant to whether a warrant is required. 
Id. 
257 See infra notes 283–307 and accompanying text (using Supreme Court cases regarding 
subpopulations of high school students to illustrate the way one population can have 
varying yet legitimate expectations of privacy). 
258 See infra notes 283–309 and accompanying text (illustrating the differing expectations 
of privacy through high school students). 
2015] DNA Testing of Arrestees 695 
aware that, due to their status, they should expect less privacy from 
government intrusions than other students.259 
There are, however, other individuals who by virtue of their special 
status deserve less privacy and should be aware they have less privacy 
than other citizens.260  The Supreme Court has made clear that 
probationers, parolees, and those in custodial facilities fall into this 
category.261  In Morrrissey v. Brewer, the Court asserted that parolees “do 
not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”262  In 
United States v. Knights, the Court held that as a probationer, Knights, 
had a “significantly diminished expectation of privacy,” and therefore a 
search of his home was permissible with reasonable suspicion but 
without probable cause or a warrant.263  In Samson v. California, the Court 
dealt with the issue of whether parolees could be searched when the 
government possessed neither reasonable suspicion nor a warrant.264  In 
permitting such searches, the Court observed that because they enjoy 
even less freedom than probationers, parolees have an expectation of 
privacy that is reduced even more than that of probationers.265  The 
Samson Court noted the restrictions on liberty that attend to parolees in 
California and the state law declaring that a parolee is in the “legal 
custody of the Department of Corrections.”266  The Court concluded that 
due to such restrictions, parolees “have severely diminished expectations 
of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”267  
The holdings in Knights and Samson make clear that due to the 
relative loss of liberty that probationers, and to a greater extent parolees, 
                                                 
259 This awareness element was described in Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., wherein the 
Supreme Court distinguished between government inspections of businesses which are 
pervasively or closely regulated, such as those that sell liquor or firearms, and others such 
as Barlow’s plumbing and electrical installation businesses, regarding the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness of such inspections.  436 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1978).  This 
distinction is based on the diminished expectation of the former because such businesses 
are aware of the heightened government scrutiny of their operations, through such things 
as periodic inspections, and in effect consent to them.  Id. at 313. 
260 See generally Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (incorporating parolees); 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001) (regarding probationers); Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538–39 (1984) (addressing those in custody). 
261 See infra notes 262–67 and accompanying text (discussing cases that highlight these 
individuals). 
262 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (quoted in Knights, 534 U.S. at 120). 
263 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–20. 
264 Samson, 547 U.S. at 847. 
265 See id. at 850 (explaining that parolees are only permitted to leave prison on parole if 
they agree to follow severe restrictions imposed, and they are typically subjected to great 
supervision while on parole). 
266 Id. at 851 (emphasis added). 
267 Id. at 852. 
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experience, they are on a continuum regarding a diminished expectation 
of privacy.  This diminished expectation of privacy due to the relative 
loss of liberty of a parolee played a large role in the Court’s decision that 
Samson could be subjected to a full-blown search without the presence of 
individualized suspicion.268  Still, even though freedom is restricted in 
the ways described above, probationers and parolees go about their 
everyday business largely free of government involvement and 
control.269  Virtually none of the activity of one who has been arrested 
and in a full custodial facility is similarly free of government 
involvement and control.270  Therefore, it would seem beyond dispute 
that an arrestee under the near total government control of a jail or 
prison has even less of an expectation of privacy than that of a parolee. 
Interestingly, the dissent of Justice Stevens in Samson makes a similar 
point regarding an expectation of privacy.271  In articulating his 
disagreement with the majority holding that Samson had no expectation 
of privacy, Justice Stevens argues that there is a difference between the 
status of a parolee or a probationer and that of a prisoner.272  “A parolee, 
like a probationer, is set free in the world subject to restrictions intended 
to facilitate supervision and guard against antisocial behavior.”273  One 
who is arrested and confined to a total custody facility such as a jail or 
prison has not been set free and therefore would seem again to have a 
lower expectation of privacy than a parolee or probationer.274 
Although they have not been convicted of crimes and are often not 
usually confined in prisons designed to hold those already convicted, 
arrestees in custodial facilities, such as jails, are deprived of their 
freedoms in ways similar to those who are confined in prisons.275  In a 
                                                 
268 See id. (examining the totality of the circumstances involved in the case). 
269 See id. at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that parolees and probationers 
are able to live freely under certain restrictions but with much less supervision and 
restraints than those imposed in prison). 
270 See Samson, 547 U.S. at 862 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984)) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (illustrating the differing expectations of privacy for parolees and 
prisoners by acknowledging that prisoners traditionally held no right to privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment because of the states’ need to implement institutional safeguards in all 
prisons). 
271 See id. at 861–64 (illustrating a lessened expectation of privacy for both prisoners and 
parolees). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 861. 
274 See generally id. (distinguishing those who are set free from those in custody). 
275 See generally Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1511 (2012) 
(holding that search procedures at county jails struck a reasonable balance between inmate 
privacy and the needs of the institution); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 521 (1979) (finding 
that maintaining security and preserving discipline are essential goals that may require 
limitation of constitutional rights); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962) (holding 
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series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that those detained in such 
custodial institutions have significantly diminished expectations of 
privacy.276  Perhaps the most definitive of those holdings was the Court’s 
relatively recent decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the 
County of Burlington.277  Florence was arrested and taken to a county 
detention center for failing to appear at a hearing regarding a warrant, 
which incorrectly alleged that he failed to pay a fine.278  Despite the 
relatively minor nature of what he was arrested for, Florence was subject 
to a full body search upon his entry into the county detention facility.279  
The officers at the facility had Florence disrobe and then subjected him to 
a search that included an inspection of the most private areas of his 
body.280  They executed this search absent any suspicion that Florence 
might have been carrying items that are prohibited in the facility.281  The 
Court found the search here to be compliant with the Fourth 
Amendment in part because the conditions and security needs of the 
institution result in arrestees detained in custodial institutions having a 
significantly reduced expectation of privacy.282 
Some have characterized the holding in Florence as being 
distinguishable from issues related to taking DNA samples from 
arrestees because the purpose and nature of the search in Florence was 
consistent with the reason for the diminished expectation of privacy of 
arrestees—institutional security.283  These courts and commentators 
                                                                                                             
that a public jail does not share the same privacy attributes as a home or office under the 
Fourth Amendment); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527 (holding that an inmate had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his prison cell). 
276 See infra note 277 and accompanying text (introducing case law regarding individuals 
in custodial institutions).  In permitting the search and confiscation of a prisoner’s private 
effects without individualized suspicion in Hudson, the Court held that prisoners have no 
expectation of privacy and noted, “a prison shares none of the attributes of privacy of a 
home, an automobile, an office or a hotel room.”  Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527.  Detention 
facilities similarly share none of these privacy attributes.  Id. (quoting Lanza, 370 U.S. at 
143–44). 
277 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1510.  The Court held that a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were not violated when he was subjected to invasive searches before entering the jail.  Id. at 
1510–11. 




282 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518. 
283 See Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d. 847, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that pre-trial 
detainee status did not warrant a DNA swab); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 422 
(3d Cir. 2011) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (stating that a statute permitting suspicionless DNA 
collection from arrestees did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Julian Ellis, Florence v. 
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders:  The Resurrection of Bell v. Wolfish and the Questions to Follow, 90 
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point out that obtaining samples of DNA to compare with DNA samples 
left at crime scenes has no relationship to the security of the institution in 
which arrestees, such as King, are housed.284  The majority in King II, 
however, asserted that establishing an individual’s identity, particularly 
an arrestee’s criminal record, is of utmost importance in maintaining the 
security of a custodial facility.285  The Court noted that establishing 
certainty about identity, through the most accurate measure possible, 
informs security related decisions about the location and conditions of an 
inmate’s housing.286 
 Still, as discussed below, it is likely more accurate to say that the 
primary purpose of laws permitting the taking of DNA samples from 
arrestees is to compare the samples to those found at crime scenes and 
thus determine if there is a link between the arrestee and those crimes.287  
Therefore, it is important to address the above argument regarding the 
relative disconnect between this purpose for obtaining the DNA samples 
of arrestees and the government’s need for institutional security that 
results in arrestees having a diminished expectation of privacy.288  In 
other words, is such a link necessary before courts can find that a 
diminished expectation of privacy is a significant factor in the balancing 
test used to determine the legality under the Fourth Amendment for 
government searches and seizures performed without individualized 
suspicion? 
The Supreme Court cases most instructive in this regard are those 
that dealt with drug testing of sub-populations of high school 
students.289  What is especially relevant in these cases is not the 
expectation of privacy of all high school students, which is diminished 
due to the supervisory and tutelary role the school plays in the lives of 
                                                                                                             
DENV. U. L. REV. 559, 573 (2012) (examining the applicability and exceptions of the Florence 
decision). 
284 Friedman, 580 F.3d at 856–57; Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 422. 
285 See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013) (“A suspect's criminal 
history is a critical part of his identity that officers should know when processing him for 
detention.  It is a common occurrence that [p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn 
out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.”). 
286 Id. at 1971–75. 
287 See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Maryland v. 
King). 
288 See generally King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (demonstrating that the privacy expectations of 
those in custody is greatly diminished). 
289 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995) (holding that student 
athlete drug testing policy did not violate students’ federal or state constitutional rights to 
be free from unreasonable searches); see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822 (2002) (holding that drug testing students 
participating in competitive extra-curricular activities was reasonable). 
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its students.290  Instead, it is the claimed additional reduction in the 
expectation of privacy of sub-populations in schools that allows the 
government to drug test these particular groups without individualized 
suspicion.291  When approving the drug testing of students who were on 
the football team of an Oregon high school without any individualized 
suspicion of drug use in Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, the Court 
offered two reasons why the members of the team had a diminished 
expectation of privacy when compared to other students.292  The first 
reason offered by the Court is related to the “element of communal 
undress inherent in athletic participation.”293  The Court here referred to 
the “suiting up” and “showering” of the players as reasons why “school 
sports are not for the bashful.”294  The purpose of compelling high school 
athletes to provide urine samples is to see if they have ingested illegal 
drugs.295  Whether this purpose relates to the diminished expectation of 
privacy stemming from the supposed lack of bashfulness apparently 
required for high school students to play football is debatable.296 
The second reason offered by the Court in Vernonia as to why high 
school athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy however leaves 
no doubt about its lack of connection to the purpose for the search and 
seizure involved with the drug testing of urine samples.297  According to 
the Court, this has to do with the higher degree of regulation students 
supposedly agree to by going out for a high school sports team.298  The 
Court noted that: 
They must submit to a preseason physical 
exam[,] . . . they must acquire adequate insurance 
coverage or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a 
minimum grade point average, and comply with any 
“rules of conduct, dress, training hours and related 
matters as may be established for each sport by the head 
                                                 
290 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 655–56 (finding that random drug testing of 
student-athletes did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
291 See infra notes 292, 302 and accompanying text (listing the cases involving high school 
populations). 
292 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 655–56. 
293 Id. at 657. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. at 648–52. 
296 See generally id. at 657 (addressing the lack of bashfulness in student-athletes). 
297 See generally id. (reasoning that student-athletes assent to the searches as a condition of 
playing sports). 
298 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 657. 
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coach and athletic director with the principal's 
approval.”299 
As the Court further noted, “[s]omewhat like adults who choose to 
participate in a ‘closely regulated industry,’ students who voluntarily 
participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon 
normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”300  While the 
regulations that arrestees are subjected to are, of course, not voluntary 
like they are with students who make the choice to play football, 
arrestees entering jails have far more reason to expect far more intense 
intrusions on their rights to privacy.301  Most importantly, there is no 
connection between the purpose of the search and seizure, drug testing 
urine, and the supposed reduction in privacy stemming from 
requirements such as purchasing insurance, maintaining a minimum 
GPA, and following rules of conduct and dress directed by team coaches. 
In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Court confronted issues related to the 
constitutionality of drug testing all students who participated in all 
extracurricular activities.302  The Court first minimized the significance of 
the point it had made in Vernonia about the diminished expectation of 
privacy of athletes deriving to some degree from the fact that they were 
subjected to frequent physicals and communal undress.303  In doing so, it 
made even clearer the relative unimportance of the connection between 
the government need that results in a group’s diminished expectation of 
privacy and the purpose of the search or seizure that is permitted in part 
because of that diminution.304  The Court’s conclusion was that because 
all students participating in extracurricular activities are subject to 
certain regulations beyond what non-participating students are subjected 
to, the privacy of these students is further diminished.305  In fact, the 
                                                 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970–71 (2013). 
302 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822, 822 (2002) (upholding the constitutionality of drug testing of students in 
extracurricular activities). 
303 Id. at 831. 
304 Id. 
305 Id.; see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 650 (addressing student drug testing 
policies).  It is reasonable to question the Court’s assertion that all students participating in 
extracurricular activities have a diminished expectation of privacy thus allowing for the 
drug testing of their urine without individualized suspicion or a warrant.  Bd. of Educ. of 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty., 536 U.S. at 822.  Regardless, it is difficult to 
understand how anyone could claim that such students have any less of an expectation of 
privacy than those confined to custodial institutions after being arrested for serious 
felonies.  Taking the comparison of the two forms of testing farther, it would seem that 
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Court apparently did not feel the need to enumerate what those 
restrictions on freedom were with respect to each extracurricular group, 
thus emphasizing that what matters is not the specific reasons for the 
restrictions or their connection to the particular search or seizure at issue, 
but the fact that the restrictions in some way create a diminished 
expectation of privacy.306  This diminution in the privacy expectation of 
students participating in extracurricular activities while not related to the 
need to drug test them, is according the Court, a significant factor in 
allowing this search and seizure without individualized suspicion.307 
What is beyond dispute is that the extent of the intrusion involved in 
taking a swab from the cheek of a detainee is far less than that involved 
in the full body search that the Court permitted in Florence.308  It would 
be something of an anomaly to determine that the highly intrusive full 
body search of someone detained for even a minor offense is permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment but a far less intrusive search (when the 
uses of the sample are limited as in the Maryland statute at issue in King 
II) done only for those arrested for serious crimes is not.309  There is then 
at least one clear conclusion that can be drawn from previous holdings of 
the Supreme Court regarding the balancing test to determine the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness of searches done of arrestees in custodial 
institutions.310  Due to the significantly diminished expectations of 
privacy of such detainees, limited non-arbitrary searches and seizures 
affected without individualized suspicion are permitted to accomplish 
appropriate governmental purposes.311 
                                                                                                             
compelling teenagers to urinate, sometimes while being observed to insure the integrity of 
the samples provided, is more embarrassing than swabbing the cheeks for DNA.  Such 
embarrassment is relevant to the extent of the government intrusion for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 650; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 n.7 (1989) (addressing random drug testing among railroad 
employees).  Of course urine samples, like DNA, can be used for purposes beyond just 
detecting the presence of illegal drugs; however, most drug testing programs provide 
protections against abuse of the data acquired through the tests, but not always with the 
strong punitive measures of the Maryland DNA statute at issue in King. 
306 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty., 536 U.S. at 823. 
307 Id. at 832. 
308 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012). 
309 See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (conveying that those 
booked in custody undergo extensive physical examinations). 
310 See supra Part V (elaborating on Supreme Court holdings regarding the reasonableness 
test). 
311 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (validating extensive searches of detainees). 
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VII.  PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST 
Courts use the primary purpose test to determine reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment.312  First, Part VII.A assesses the use of the 
primary purpose test in regards to DNA testing.313  Second, Part VII.B 
explains why the test is unclear in its definition and inconsistent in its 
application.314  Last, Part VII.C suggests that the primary purpose test 
protects the wrong people.315 
A. The Primary Purpose Test as it Relates to the DNA Testing of Arrestees 
The principle Fourth Amendment barrier to the government’s ability 
to take and test DNA swabs from arrestees appears to be what has been 
referred to as the primary purpose test.316  That is, for searches and 
seizures performed without individualized suspicion, the primary 
purpose of such a Fourth Amendment intrusion must be other than 
“ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”317  In his dissenting opinion in King II, 
for example, Justice Scalia asserted that while the Court had approved 
suspicionless intrusions into interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, those intrusions were not when the “primary purpose was 
to detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing.”318  The “appropriate” non-
criminal investigatory purposes of such suspicionless searches and 
seizures have been variously categorized by courts as “administrative,” 
“special needs,” or falling within some subcategory often referred to as 
intrusions based on “general reasonableness.”319  Regardless of what 
they are called, the definition, interpretation, and application of such 
approaches to suspicionless searches and seizures has been inconsistent, 
confusing, and often not based on the real values behind the Fourth 
Amendment.320  This Part also examines the meaning or meanings of the 
                                                 
312 See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000) (elaborating on the 
primary purpose test). 
313 See infra Part VII.A (applying the primary purpose test to DNA testing). 
314 See infra Part VII.B (insinuating that the test is unclear). 
315  See infra Part VII.C (suggesting there is no good reason that the primary purpose test 
may protect the wrong people). 
316 Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013). 
317 Id. (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38). 
318 Id. at 1981–82. 
319 See Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (stating 
“administrative” searches are significant intrusions on Fourth Amendment interests); see 
also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (discussing “special needs” 
searches); Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 405 (5th Cir. 
2002) (referring to the Supreme Court’s application of a “general reasonableness” test that 
was articulated in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971)). 
320 See infra Part VII.A (elaborating on the inconsistencies in primary purpose test). 
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primary purpose test as formulated by the Supreme Court and explores 
whether the primary purpose of a suspicionless search or seizure should 
be an integral factor in a determination of its legality under the Fourth 
Amendment.321 
The government in King II identified two purposes for taking DNA 
samples from those arrested for serious crimes.322  As discussed above, 
the first purpose is to assist in the accurate identification of arrestees.323  
This is akin to the use of fingerprints in allowing the authorities to learn, 
among other things, if the arrestee is who he claims he is, whether he has 
a criminal record, and whether there are outstanding warrants against 
him.324  It is critical to have such information for purposes related, but 
not limited, to the nature of the charges to be brought, bail 
considerations, and sentencing factors.325  The Court in King II spent 
much of its opinion enumerating and evaluating the government’s 
interests in establishing the arrestee’s identification and use of DNA 
testing to do so.326  While Justice Scalia’s dissent focused as well on this 
purpose for testing, he mocked the majority’s claim that identification 
was the primary purpose of the testing.327  Justice Scalia concluded part 
of his dissent by saying “it is safe to say that if the Court’s identification 
theory is not wrong, there is no such thing as error.”328 
Fingerprints remain the principle method of establishing the 
identification of arrestees, but because there may be omissions in certain 
fingerprint-based reports of an arrestee’s prior record or at times just to 
confirm his identity, courts have accepted this as a proper government 
                                                 
321 See infra Part VII (discussing the primary purpose test and its potential place in the 
Fourth Amendment). 
322 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1975–76. 
323 Id. (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004)). 
324 Id. at 1972. 
325 Id.  When a person has been previously convicted of a crime, the charge he faces when 
accused again of the same crime can be a more serious.  C.f. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW 
§ 5-607 (West 2006).  The purpose of setting bail is to insure the defendant’s appearance at 
all court proceedings up to trial.  King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–73.  A secondary purpose is to 
assess the danger to the community if the defendant is freed pending trial.  Id. at 1973.  
Whether the defendant has a criminal record and what crimes he has been convicted of 
play an important role in that determination.  Id.  Finally, when a judge decides on what 
sentence a defendant should receive, the severity of the sentence is often based in large part 
upon the defendant’s criminal history.  Id.  In certain instances, prior convictions may 
permit or require a longer prison sentence.  C.f. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (West 
2013). 
326 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–74. 
327 Id. at 1983–84. 
328 Id. at 1986. 
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interest in conducting such DNA testing.329  Some courts have used the 
fact that DNA testing can establish or confirm the identity of an arrestee 
as a way around the primary purpose test.330  The purpose of this 
identification function for DNA testing is administrative in nature and 
not focused on investigating ordinary criminal wrongdoing.331  If this is 
the primary purpose of DNA testing of arrestees, then the Supreme 
Court holdings which require individualized suspicion for such 
government investigatory searches or seizures would not be applicable 
to the DNA testing of arrestees.332  In King II, the majority opinion 
argued that identification was an important purpose of DNA testing, and 
therefore individualized suspicion was not necessary to conduct the 
tests, but the manner in which the Court discussed what it meant by 
identification was somewhat confusing and opened the door to the 
criticism in Justice Scalia’s dissent.333 
Courts that make the above argument are not incorrect in the claim 
that DNA testing can and does get used for identification purposes.334  
Those courts, however, are being somewhat disingenuous in making the 
assertion that this should be sufficient to avoid the strictures of the 
primary purpose test.  States that use such DNA testing do not limit the 
results to mere arrestee identification, and in fact, most acknowledge that 
                                                 
329 See Dist. Attorney’s Office Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009) 
(recognizing the value of DNA evidence); Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 
2012) (expressing that DNA evidence is more reliable than fingerprinting); United States v. 
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that DNA is a more reliable means of 
identification); Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 52 (Md. 2004) (Wilner, J., concurring) 
(asserting that DNA is more reliable and serves the same governmental interest that 
justifies fingerprints).  See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, The Nas, and the Future 
of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1243–44 (2010) (discounting the accuracy of 
fingerprinting). 
330 See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2004) (identifying that the primary 
purpose was not for evidence but reliable proof of identification); see also Jenkins v. United 
States, 75 A.3d 174, 177 (D.C. 2013) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting that DNA was used 
to identify the accused). 
331 King II, 133 S. Ct. 1970. 
332 When the Supreme Court held that the drug interdiction checkpoints established by 
the Indianapolis police violated the Fourth Amendment, because cars were seized without 
individualized suspicion, the Court based its opinion on the conclusion that the primary 
purpose of these checkpoints was “to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”  
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000).  In so doing, the Edmond Court 
discussed prior Supreme Court cases in which the primary purpose of the search or seizure 
was crucial to determining whether individualized suspicion was required to comply with 
the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 37–40. 
333 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970, 1983 (arguing that DNA identification of arrestees is 
important and criticizing the process of identifying arrestees). 
334 See generally Green, 354 F.3d at 678 (discussing identification as a primary purpose); 
Jenkins, 75 A.3d at 177 (conveying that the accused was identified through DNA). 
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the primary purpose of taking DNA swabs from arrestees is to compare 
the DNA to similar evidence left at the scenes of serious crimes to 
determine if there is a match.335  The Maryland statute at issue in King II 
allows for precisely that.336  It is unlikely that law enforcement agencies 
would incur the costs associated with DNA testing merely to catch the 
relatively few mistakes in identifying suspects that occur from 
fingerprint analysis.337  Additionally, as Justice Scalia argues in his 
dissent in King II, the amount of time needed to get the results from 
DNA testing would make such testing largely unhelpful in 
accomplishing the benefits of having an accurate identification of the 
arrestee.338  It is far more reasonable to assume that because a DNA 
match is a powerful tool that can help solve serious unsolved crimes, as 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in King II agree, law 
enforcement agencies are anxious to test at least those arrested for 
                                                 
335 DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/pages/collection-from-arrestees. 
aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Y9GM-5GVY.  In his dissent in King II, Justice Scalia 
notes in this regard:  
That is certainly how everyone has always understood the Maryland 
Act until today.  The Governor of Maryland, in commenting on our 
decision to hear this case, said that he was glad, because “[a]llowing 
law enforcement to collect DNA samples . . . is absolutely critical to 
our efforts to continue driving down crime,” and “bolsters our efforts 
to resolve open investigations and bring them to a resolution.  The 
attorney general of Maryland remarked that he “look[ed] forward to 
the opportunity to defend this important crime-fighting tool,” and 
praised the DNA database for helping to “bring to justice violent 
perpetrators.”  Even this Court's order staying the decision below 
states that the statute “provides a valuable tool for investigating 
unsolved crimes and thereby helping to remove violent offenders from 
the general population”—with, unsurprisingly, no mention of identity.  
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
336 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (discussing the statute).  MD. CODE ANN., PUBLIC SAFETY 
§ 2-505 (2011).  “(a) To the extent fiscal resources are available, DNA samples shall be 
collected and tested:  (1) to analyze and type the genetic markers contained in or derived 
from the DNA samples; (2) as part of an official investigation into a crime.”  Id. 
337 For example, in Maryland in 2013, the year the Supreme Court decided King II, 
approximately 5000 Maryland samples were added to the national DNA database.  
Maryland Study on Preventable Crimes, supra note 231.  If the cost of taking and testing each 
sample ranges from $35 to $50, the total cost for that year in Maryland would be from 
$175,000 to $250,000.  Id.  It seems unlikely a state would incur that expense just to confirm 
what fingerprint testing already reveals and providing such information for only the 
limited amount of felony arrests that permit such testing.  Eric Ferkenhoff & Maurice 
Possley, DNA Tests Urged for All Arrestees, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2002), available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-16/news/0202160181_1_dna-samples-dna-
evidence-felony-arrests, archived at http://perma.cc/2J53-TBWM. 
338 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1983–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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serious crimes to determine if they are connected to other such crimes.339  
Therefore, the primary purpose of DNA testing of arrestees is very likely 
that of criminal investigation.340  Contrary to the view of courts that have 
found the DNA testing of arrestees to be violative of the Fourth 
Amendment however, such a conclusion about the primary purpose of 
such testing should be the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry about 
the constitutionality of this procedure.341 
There are several significant problems that attend the use of the 
primary purpose test as the determining factor regarding whether 
government searches and seizures require the presence of individualized 
suspicion.  The definition of the test is unclear and courts have added to 
this confusion in attempting to apply the test.  The acceptance of the test 
leads to better Fourth Amendment protection for those engaged in 
criminal activity than those who are not.  Another problem is that courts 
can and do evade the test by creating subcategories for searches and 
seizures which allows the use of general reasonableness in lieu of 
individualized suspicion regardless of the primary purpose of the 
intrusion.342 
B. The Test is Unclear in its Definition and Inconsistent in its Application 
The case often cited for the use of the primary purpose test as the 
determining factor in whether individualized suspicion is necessary for a 
Fourth Amendment intrusion is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.343  In 
Edmond, the Supreme Court held that a motor vehicle checkpoint 
designed to interdict the flow of illegal drugs violated the Fourth 
Amendment because it did not require individualized suspicion to seize 
a vehicle.344  The Court acknowledged, as previous cases had made clear, 
that individualized suspicion was not an “irreducible component of 
reasonableness[,]” the ultimate test of Fourth Amendment compliance, 
                                                 
339 Id. at 1973; id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
340 Id. at 1983–85 (addressing law enforcement’s focus on testing DNA to solve other 
crimes). 
341 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 232–33 (4th Cir. 2012); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1166 (Vt. 2008) (Johnson, J., 
dissenting); see Julie Rikelman, Justifying Forcible DNA Testing Schemes Under the Special 
Needs Exception to the Fourth Amendment:  A Dangerous Precedent, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 41, 75–
76 (2007) (concluding that DNA testing of arrestees cannot be justified under Fourth 
Amendment). 
342 See Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire:  The Supreme Court 
Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 419, 422–23 (2007) (recognizing that the Court has been inconsistent with treatment 
of searches due to the ambiguity of the primary purpose test). 
343 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
344 Id. at 45–48. 
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but asserted that its absence was permitted in only limited 
circumstances.345  The Court referred to these circumstances as special 
needs beyond normal enforcement of criminal law.346  Specifically, the 
Court identified such special needs in prior holdings dealing with drug 
testing of students and others, the search of a business dealing in the sale 
of used car parts, border area checkpoints to detect the presence of 
undocumented aliens and sobriety checkpoints.347  Referring to the 
checkpoint cases specifically, but including all the special needs cases, 
the Edmond Court wrote, “[i]n none of these cases, however, did we 
indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was 
to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”348 
One iteration of the primary purpose test is its use in allowing for 
the search of closely regulated businesses without the traditional 
probable cause and warrant requirements.349  Due to the fact that some 
businesses are highly regulated, they are deemed to have a diminished 
expectation of privacy when it comes to their protection under the 
Fourth Amendment regarding government intrusions.350  In United States 
v. Biswell, for example, the Court permitted the warrantless search of a 
pawnshop licensed to sell firearms in part because the highly regulated 
nature of the firearms industry made such warrantless searches 
reasonable.351  In Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., the Court made an even 
stronger statement on the subject writing that “certain industries have 
such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy could exist for the proprietor over the stock of such an 
enterprise.”352 
Nine years after the Court wrote the above quote, it made clear that 
for the government to take advantage of the “closely regulated” business 
                                                 
345 Id. 
346 Id.  In some of the cases in which the Court has excused this requirement for 
individualized suspicion, terms other than “special needs” have been used, but the essence 
of the principle was the same—that the primary purpose of the search or seizure was other 
than routine enforcement of the criminal laws.  Id. at 37–38. 
347 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
830–32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (regarding railroad workers involved in 
accidents); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 65, 677 (1989); New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 701 (1987); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1990). 
348 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38. 
349 Burger, 482 U.S. at 719. 
350 Id. 
351 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). 
352 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).  Although the Court in Marshall held that merely because a 
business operates in interstate commerce does not mean it falls within the realm of being 
pervasively regulated.  Id. at 314; Burger, 482 U.S. at 719. 
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doctrine, there must be a “substantial government interest” in regulating 
the industry that goes beyond merely enforcing criminal laws.353  In New 
York  v. Burger, the Court held that the warrantless search of a junkyard 
dealing in the dismantling and selling of used automobile parts falls 
within the “closely regulated business” doctrine and therefore does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.354  In so holding, the Court reversed the 
judgment of the New York Court of Appeals, that the inspection 
conducted by police officers was to ferret out crime and not to “enforce a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.”355  The Supreme Court rejected the 
New York court’s analysis and conclusion regarding the nature of the 
inspections.356  The New York Court had held that because they were 
carried out by police officers and not regulatory agency officials, and that 
violations could and would result in criminal sanctions, the 
government’s claim that this was an administrative inspection was 
merely a ruse for enforcing the criminal law.357   
The Court in Burger held that the state may “address a major social 
problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal 
sanctions.”358  Omitted from the Burger decision was whether the Court 
considered the regulatory or criminal investigation purpose to be the 
primary one.359  This raises the question as to whether the non-criminal 
purpose of the test must indeed be primary or whether its mere existence 
is sufficient to avoid the requirement of individualized suspicion.  
Instead, the Court spoke of the criminal and regulatory investigations 
having perhaps the same “ultimate” purpose but different “subsidiary” 
purposes—a difference in this context similar to that between ends and 
means.360  Here, the subsidiary regulatory purpose was said to be the 
regulation of the automobile dismantling industry to ensure that the 
businesses are legitimate and that stolen vehicle parts passing through 
junkyards can be identified.361  The subsidiary purpose of the penal law 
                                                 
353 Burger, 482 U.S. at 700, 702. 
354 See id. at 701, 707 (taking note of the Court’s holding that the “closely related” 
business doctrine applies to the regulation of junkyards). 
355 See id. at 697–98 (discussing that the Court’s holding that the regulation of junkyards 
falls within the parameters of the “closely related” business doctrine overturned the lower 
New York Court of Appeals decision). 
356 See id. at 712 (noting that the New York court found the statute a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
357 See id. (holding that the search falls within the administrative inspection exception of 
“closely related business,” rather than a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
358 Id. at 712. 
359 See generally Burger, 482 U.S. at 691 (negating any clarification). 
360 See id. at 713 (discussing the differences and similarities between the “ultimate” and 
“subsidiary” purposes). 
361 See id. at 713–14 (examining the purpose behind the legislation). 
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here is to punish for possession of stolen property.362  While the ultimate 
purpose of both may be to address the “major social problem” involved 
here, the Court claimed this difference in subsidiary purposes allowed 
for the use of the “closely regulated business” justification for the 
warrantless search conducted.363  
 The Court in Burger made the definition of the primary purpose test 
more confusing by examining the search in terms of two different 
subsidiary purposes, leading to an ultimate purpose that targeted a 
major social problem.364  In Ferguson v. Charleston, the Court introduced 
yet another method of approaching the primary purpose test dealing 
with subsidiary and ultimate purposes.365  Ferguson held that tests of 
pregnant women designed to deter such women from using drugs 
because of the resulting harm, both to them and their unborn children, 
violated the Fourth Amendment.366  The Court reasoned that the 
ultimate goal of the testing may have been therapeutic—that is to get 
women into drug rehabilitation clinics and deter other pregnant women 
from using drugs.367  However, the means, the use of law enforcement 
personnel and the criminal justice system, demonstrated the primary 
purpose of the program was more penal than administrative or special 
need.368  Of course, the search in Burger was also conducted by police 
and ultimately enforced through the criminal justice system, but the 
Ferguson Court distinguished Burger due to the diminished expectation 
of privacy of the automobile parts dealership in that case.369  
Seemingly even more on point to the issues in Ferguson, were the 
Supreme Court’s previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of 
sobriety checkpoints and drug testing among certain other groups 
conducted without individualized suspicion.370  A primary purpose of 
                                                 
362 See id. at 713 (noting the underlying purpose of the law). 
363 See id. at 712–13 (noting that the Court found the “closely regulated” business doctrine 
applicable because of the differences between the purposes).  
364 Id. at 712. 
365 See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001) (holding that “special need” was yet 
another exception making suspicionless searched constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
366 Id. at 79. 
367 Id. 
368 See id. at 82–84 (describing that the primary purpose was not within the 
administrative or special need exception). 
369 See id. at 83–84 n.21 (discussing the Ferguson Court’s way of distinguishing the Burger 
facts). 
370 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (holding that sobriety 
checkpoints were constitutional); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie 
Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (holding that suspiciousness drug testing is 
constitutional); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995) (holding 
that Vernonia’s drug testing policy was constitutional because of the decreased expectation 
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sobriety checkpoints is claimed to be deterring motorists from driving 
while drunk.371  In Ferguson, a similar deterrent purpose was at issue.372  
Also similar to the drug testing in Ferguson was the subsidiary purpose 
of the government action in sobriety checkpoints, the use of the criminal 
justice system to achieve those ends.373  While in Sitz, the Court regarded 
the seizures at sobriety checkpoints to be minor intrusions, the Court in 
Ferguson held that acquiring and testing the urine samples of pregnant 
women was a significant intrusion.374 
Yet, the Court allowed the suspicionless taking of urine samples for 
drug testing purposes in a series of cases beginning with Skinner.375  In 
these cases, the Court held that that the level of intrusion caused by the 
testing of urine samples was not extensive enough to make the search 
there unreasonable under the balancing test of the Fourth 
Amendment.376  The next task then for the Court in Ferguson was to 
distinguish the drug testing there from those previous cases that had 
permitted such testing without individualized suspicion.377 
In doing so, the Court in Ferguson offered a distinction that is 
especially relevant to the determination of how the DNA testing of 
arrestees should fare under the primary purpose test.378  The Court 
regarded the intrusion in Ferguson as more extensive than in the other 
                                                                                                             
of privacy and the need for the search); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 
489 U.S. 656, 663, 666–67, 672 n.2 (1989) (holding that the searches were constitutional 
because of the substantial government interest); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 624 (1989) (holding that that searches were reasonable because the privacy intrusion 
were minimal and an important government interest was at stake). 
371 See Steven Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints:  Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections, 
12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 157 n.189 (1984) (discussing the purpose of the roadblocks to arrest 
drunk drivers). 
372 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82–83 (noting the program’s ultimate goal). 
373 See id. at 83–84 (discussing the search’s objective).  
374 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451–52 (examining the level of intrusiveness of sobriety 
checkpoints); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (stating that the drug test was found to be intrusive 
because of the privacy expectations between a patient and a doctor). 
375 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (holding that suspicionless drug testing was 
constitutional); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 664–65 (holding that Vernonia’s 
drug testing policy was constitutional because of the decreased expectation of privacy and 
the need for the search); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663, 666–67, 672 n.2 (holding that the searches 
were constitutional because of the substantial government interest). 
376 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (finding that the search was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment); see also id. at 621 n.5, 622 n.6 (noting that the Ferguson Court distinguished 
the extent of the intrusion involved in that case with the lesser intrusion resulting from the 
drug testing of railroad employees after accidents and certain employees of the United 
States Customs Service); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663, 666–67, 672 n.2 (holding that 
suspicionless drug testing was constitutional). 
377 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78. 
378 Id. 
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drug testing cases because, “[i]n the previous four cases, there was no 
misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential use of 
the test results, and there were protections against the dissemination of 
the results to third parties.”379  An examination of the DNA testing 
statute at issue in King II, with these criteria in mind, reveals that the 
Maryland law stated explicitly the purposes of the testing.380  The 
purpose was to aid in criminal investigations, and that dissemination to 
third parties was considered a crime to be punished by law.381 
Whether these and the several other distinctions offered by the Court 
on what appears to be a case-by-case basis are valid, it does not change 
the fact that the various explanations offered by the Court discussed 
above muddle the primary purpose test.  In Edmond, for example, the 
Court’s conclusion that the primary purpose of the drug interdiction 
checkpoint was the enforcement of criminal law was a reasonable one.382  
What however of the state’s contention that the checkpoints were 
designed to deal with the non-criminal major social problems incurred 
from the sale and use of illegal drugs?383  Certainly, as the Edmond Court 
acknowledged, both the direct problems that flow from drug use and 
their spin-off consequences are severe.384  One might argue that they are 
even more severe than those that come from the sale of stolen auto parts, 
the reduction of which is a non-criminal purpose, the Burger Court held 
to be severe enough to permit suspicionless searches.385  The Court in 
Edmond responded to this by saying the issue is not the severity of the 
problem but the nature of the interests involved and the connection of 
the government procedure to the “particular law enforcement practices 
at issue.”386  The Court in Edmond did not enumerate specifically just 
what interests and practices it regarded as trumping the severity of the 
problem addressed.  
As for the determining factor regarding why the checkpoint at issue 
could not be regarded as a special need, and therefore dispense with the 
requirement of individualized suspicion, the Court held that the primary 
purpose of such a checkpoint was to “advance ‘the general interest in 
                                                 
379 Id. 
380 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505 (2011) (proposing the purpose of DNA 
collection). 
381 See id. (stating the purpose of DNA collecting and testing); id. § 2-512 (describing the 
prohibited acts and associated penalties for improper DNA collecting and testing). 
382 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000). 
383 See id. at 41–42 (noting the purpose of the checkpoint program). 
384 See id. (discussing the severe social harms and law enforcement difficulties caused by 
narcotics). 
385 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 724 (1987) (conveying the holding).  
386 Edmond, 531 U.S.  at 42–43. 
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crime control.’”387  In describing further the application of the primary 
purpose test, the Court in Edmond declared, “[w]e decline to suspend the 
usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to 
employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating 
crimes.”388 
It was, however, for just such a purpose, the ordinary enterprise of 
investigating crimes, that the police in Lombard, Illinois established a 
roadblock.389  The roadblock was established to question all drivers 
passing through about a hit-and-run accident that had occurred in the 
general vicinity of the roadblock one week earlier.390  The Illinois 
Supreme Court, quite understandably, based its decision on the 
reasoning in Edmond, and held that the roadblock here violated the 
Fourth Amendment, and that evidence of drunk driving obtained from a 
driver who was stopped at the roadblock without individualized 
suspicion was inadmissible.391  In reversing this decision, the Supreme 
Court in Illinois v. Lidster used a different approach than it had taken in 
Edmond.392  The Court in Lidster noted that, unlike in Edmond, the 
roadblock here was not directed at the defendant but instead at seeking 
information from drivers who may have seen the hit-and-run accident.393  
The Court then found several reasons within the language and facts of 
Edmond that distinguished the two cases.394  
                                                 
387 Id. at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)). 
388 Id. (emphasis added). 
389 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004) (conveying the reason for a roadblock). 
390 See id. at 422 (explaining how the checkpoint operated). 
391 See People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 417, 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (discussing the evidence 
collected at the roadblock was inadmissible because it was obtained without individualized 
suspicion).   
392 See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424 (stating that a lack individualized suspicion does not 
automatically atomically mean the practice violated the Fourth Amendment). 
393 See id. at 423–24 (stating that the purpose of the checkpoint was not to detect criminal 
behavior, but rather it was it was to learn information about a recent incident, therefore it 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment).  Even before the Court’s decision in Lidster, 
which further confused the application of the primary purpose test, there was substantial 
misunderstanding of the test as it emerged from the decisions in Edmond and Ferguson.  See 
Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test:  A Roadblock to the National 
Law Enforcement Data Base, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2004) (noting that the “involuntary and 
suspicionless” collection of a defendant’s DNA for CODIS fails the standard set forth in 
Edmond and Ferguson). 
394 See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424 (elaborating on Edmond).  Lidster’s Court states: 
Edmond[’s] language, as well as its context, makes clear that the 
constitutionality of this latter, information-seeking kind of stop was 
not then before the Court.  Edmond refers to the subject matter of its 
holding as “stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present 
possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given 
motorist has committed some crime.”  We concede that Edmond 
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Once again, this distinction and the decision it led to may be 
reasonable, but the holding further confuses attempts to apply the 
primary purpose test.  Additionally it allows, almost invites, the police to 
manipulate the claimed purpose of a seizure.395  For example, the court 
in Lidster referred to the purpose of the roadblock here as being “not to 
determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime[,] but 
to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in 
providing information about a crime[,] in all likelihood committed by 
others.”396  This invites several questions.  Does this mean the 
determining factor regarding the need for individualized suspicion in 
conducting such a checkpoint depends on whether the suspicion relates 
to a past or current crime?  If this were the meaning of the distinction 
between Edmond and Lidster, we would be left with the anomalous result 
that it would be easier for the police to use checkpoints to investigate 
past criminal conduct rather than the seemingly more pressing 
government need to investigate crimes that are ongoing or about to take 
place.397  Does it mean that whenever the police can convince a court that 
they were not looking for a suspect or tangible evidence of a crime, but 
only for information about a crime, that they may then lawfully intrude 
upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment without 
individualized suspicion?  The roadblock in Lidster was established to 
seek information about a hit and run fatal accident that had occurred one 
week earlier.398  While certainly a serious crime, sentences for murder, 
rape, and other crimes show governments’ regard those crimes as of 
equal or greater seriousness than a hit and run accident.399  If police can 
                                                                                                             
describes the law enforcement objective there in question as a “general 
interest in crime control,” but it specifies that the phrase “general 
interest in crime control” does not refer to every “law enforcement 
objective.” 
Id. 
395 Id. at 423. 
396 Id. 
397 The Court’s landmark holding in Terry v. Ohio permitted police investigative activity 
based on less than probable cause when criminal activity was “afoot.”  392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
While the court in United States v. Hensley later broadened this permissible police 
investigative activity to past crimes, that case was limited to seizures for past crimes that 
were felonies or threatened public safety.  469 U.S. 221, 227–28 (1985).  Furthermore, the 
court in Hensley emphasized that the nature of the government interest in investigating 
past crimes was less than that in investigating crimes about to take place.  Id. at 228–29. 
398 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422. 
399 Illinois imposes a sentence of not less than four years and not more than fifteen years 
for class one felonies like rape.  730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30 (2010).  For first-degree 
murder, Illinois imposes the death sentence or imprisonment for not less than twenty 
years.  Id. 5/5-4.5-20.  Any person who leaves the scene of an accident when death occurs is 
guilty of a class one felony and a sentence of not less than four years and not more than 
fifteen years will be imposed.  625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401.  In West Virginia, an 
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seize every car, albeit for only a brief period of time, that passes the scene 
of a one-week-old accident, can they similarly seize every car driving or 
every person walking by the scene of a one-day-old rape or homicide at 
about the same time as the crime occurred?400  As with the purpose of the 
checkpoint in Lidster, the assumption here would be that people walking 
or driving by the scene of a recent crime at the location of the crime, 
might have been there as well on the crime date and observed something 
that would help the police apprehend a suspect.401  Of course, if the 
seizure is deemed to be valid, then the plain view rule or observations by 
the police made about an individual during the stop could authorize the 
seizure of contraband or as in Lidster’s case, his arrest based on observed 
behavior.402 
Even more confusion, however, is created by the last words of the 
Court in the above quoted passage, permitting checkpoints that ask 
individuals “about a crime in all likelihood committed by others.”403  If 
the perpetrator of the crime is somewhat likely to be discovered at a 
seizure, does this mean the detention is unlawful without individualized 
suspicion?  In other words, should courts looking to apply the primary 
purpose test to police procedures authorizing seizures without 
individualized suspicion examine not just whether the purpose was 
merely to seek information from innocent people, but whether it was 
likely that the stops would involve only motorists unconnected to the 
crime being investigated?  To accomplish this 180-degree gyration of 
                                                                                                             
individual is sentenced to life in prison if found guilty of first-degree murder.  W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 61-2-2 (2014).  For first-degree robbery, West Virginia imposes a sentence of at least 
ten years.  Id. § 61-2-12(a)(1).  Further, any person who leaves the scene of an accident when 
death occurs is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned for 
not less than one year nor more than five years, or both fined and confined.  Id. § 17C-4-
1(b).  In Rhode Island, an individual is sentenced to life in prison if found guilty of first-
degree murder.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (2014).  For first-degree robbery, Rhode 
Island imposes a sentence of not less than ten years imprisonment, and an individual may 
be imprisoned for life or fined not more than $15,000, or both.  Id. § 11-39-1(a).  
Additionally, any person who leaves the scene of an accident when a death occurs shall be 
punished by imprisoned for not less than two years and for not more than fifteen years, by 
a fine of not less than $5000 nor more than $10,000, and his or her license to operate a motor 
vehicle shall be revoked for three years.  Id. § 31-26-1(d)(1). 
400 See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422 (rationalizing the one-week-old accident roadblock). 
401 Id. at 425.  Additionally, the police could validly ask for consent to search the car or a 
person once the detention at the checkpoint is deemed to be lawful.  See, e.g., Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38–39 (1996) (expanding on what police can do at a lawful 
checkpoint). 
402 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422.  The plain view rule allows for the police to seize evidence if 
they are in a place they have a right to be, see or in some way use their senses to detect the 
evidence, and have probable cause to believe what they see is evidence of a crime.  See, e.g., 
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (explaining the plain-view doctrine). 
403 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423. 
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what normally needs to be shown to justify the government’s right to 
search or seize under the Fourth Amendment, the police would 
apparently have to show that they did not have individualized suspicion 
or probable cause of criminal activity regarding the seized car or 
individual.  At the very least, they would seemingly have to show that 
they had no information that the car or person stopped had any 
involvement in the crime that the police were investigating.404  
Additionally, in attempting to divine the “true” purpose of the police 
seizure at issue, a court would risk the very problems described by the 
Supreme Court when it permitted pretext stops in Whren v. United States 
based only on whether the officer’s action was objectively reasonable.405 
C. The Test Protects the Wrong People and for No Good Reason 
Ironically, amid the confusion surrounding the Court’s use of the 
primary purpose test, the one clear principle that emerges from the 
Court’s applications of the test is that it protects groups of people 
suspected of crimes more than those about whom there is no 
suspicion.406  The test requires the government to have individualized 
suspicion when the primary purpose of the search or seizure is to 
apprehend a criminal or obtain evidence of a crime, but excuses similar 
suspicionless intrusions when the primary purpose addresses 
                                                 
404 When the Supreme Court in California v. Acevedo modified its interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment regarding the search of containers located in automobiles, it noted the 
anomaly of prohibiting such searches without warrants when the police had probable 
cause there was evidence of a crime within the specific container but permitting such 
searches when the probable cause went to the vehicle in general.  500 U.S. at 565, 577 
(1991).  In other words, the more the police knew, the less they could accomplish.  Such an 
anomaly is similar to the interpretation of the primary purpose test alluded to above where 
the police would have to show they did not believe a suspect was in the vehicle to 
authorize its seizure at a roadblock.  A similar anomaly existed with application of the 
plain view rule before the Court’s decision in Horton v. California, 496 U.S 128 (1990).  
Before Horton, to seize evidence under the plain view rule, the police had to prove they did 
not have probable cause that the evidence they ultimately seized was located in the place 
from where the seizure took place.  Horton eliminated the requirement that the finding of 
the evidence needed to be inadvertent for the plain view rule to apply.  Id. at 130. 
405 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996); see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) 
(discussing the Court’s refusal to place any relevance on the reason why a police officer 
chose to exercise his discretion to make an arrest when he could have issued a citation); 
Butterfoss, supra note 341, at 484 (arguing that it would be even more difficult to divine the 
primary purpose of investigative activity in the “collective consciousness” of the police for 
establishing program such as checkpoints or the DNA testing of all arrestees charged with 
serious crimes). 
406 George M. Dery & Kevin Meehan, Making the Roadblock a “Routine Part of American 
Life:”  Illinois v. Lidster’s Extension of Police Checkpoint Power, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 105, 120–21 
(2004). 
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individuals not suspected of crime.407  For this apparent anomaly to be 
permitted, there would need to be a substantial reason to justify it.408  In 
searching for such a reason, one needs to explore the well-established 
test for Fourth Amendment reasonableness.409  The use of this test has 
characterized much of the jurisprudence surrounding searches and 
seizures that take place without the presence of individualized suspicion.  
That test requires balancing the extent of the intrusion in an area 
protected by the Fourth Amendment against the government’s need to 
do so.410  In analyzing the extent of the intrusion, the Court has examined 
both the physical and subjective intrusions that result from the 
government’s action.411  For example, the Court has permitted certain 
seizures without individualized suspicion when systematically checking 
for undocumented aliens at checkpoints, but not when random cars are 
pulled over for the same purpose.412  In the latter situation, the Court 
required articulable individualized suspicion to stop a car.413  The 
distinction between the two types of seizures, according to the Court, 
relates to the subjective nature of the intrusions.414  The Court found that 
the regularity and other aspects of checkpoint stops create less 
apprehension in the driver than being pulled over at random.415 
In comparing the extent of the intrusions at checkpoints designed to 
look for evidence of a crime such as the one in Edmond, with those 
seeking information of a past crime, such as in Lidster, the physical 
nature of the intrusion is essentially the same.416  The driver and his or 
her passengers are seized in a way that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment.417  In each, they may be detained only briefly.418  
Additionally, no search of the car is permitted without consent or the 
                                                 
407 See supra Part VII (addressing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the primary 
purpose test). 
408 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (explaining criminal behavior as a 
substantial justification).  “It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private 
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is 
suspected of criminal behavior.”  Id. 
409 See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013) (discussing reasonableness). 
410 See supra Part V (describing the balancing test). 
411 See supra Part V.A (establishing the Court’s analysis of intrusion). 
412 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567–68 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273–75 (1973). 
413 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273–75. 
414 Martinez-Fuerte, 528 U.S. at 559. 
415 Id.; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880–81 (1975). 
416 See Dery & Meehan, supra note 405, at 126–29 (comparing Lidster and Edmond). 
417 Id. 
418 Id. 
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presence of the appropriate degree of individualized suspicion.419  If 
evidence of a crime has nothing to do with the reason for the checkpoint 
becomes apparent, the police may seize it under the plain view rule.420 
Regarding the subjective nature of the intrusion, one commentator 
has characterized a somewhat different, but analytically similar, 
situation in a manner that raises further doubt about the efficacy of the 
primary purpose test:   
As a law-abiding citizen, the government purpose 
behind a government intrusion matters very little to 
me—it is the intrusion itself that concerns and bothers 
me.  To use the traffic checkpoint as an example, I am 
irritated and inconvenienced by the fact that my ability 
to continue on my way is interfered with when I have 
done nothing to give the government reason to suspect 
me of wrongdoing.  It is no comfort to me that the 
government intrusion is merely for a “regulatory” 
purpose.  In fact, just the opposite may be true;[] I am 
more likely to be bothered by a “non-criminal” 
intrusion.  Catching criminals seems more important to 
me than checking licenses and registrations,[] so I am 
more willing to understand and appreciate the need for 
the government to act,[] especially since I am not a 
criminal.  If the stop is for a regulatory purpose, I may 
be affected and inconvenienced to a greater extent.  I do 
not have drugs in my car, but I may have forgotten my 
license, registration or insurance card, or they may have 
lapsed by a few days.  While the consequences are 
unlikely to be grave, they will inconvenience me by 
costing me time and money.[]  And I am likely to be 
even more upset because “I wasn't doing anything 
wrong” when the government discovered my errors.  I 
am much less likely to complain if I am caught speeding 
and the license and registration offenses are discovered 
collateral to that.  I am still inconvenienced and not 
                                                 
419 See id. at 121–22 (“the . . . ‘general crime control’ purpose versus the ‘information-
seeking’ purpose might appear to be a distinction without a difference, . . . [a] driver might 
wonder exactly how the stop is less intrusive just because the police are bothering him or 
her about someone else”).  These authors then characterize the objective nature of the 
intrusions permitted by the Court in Lidster but prohibited in Edmond to be “monotonously 
similar.”  Id. 
420 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000) (elaborating on the open-view 
principle). 
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happy, but I am less likely to feel I have been treated 
unfairly or the government has been overbearing.  And a 
license and registration check in the middle of the day 
on my usual route to work or shopping or recreation 
certainly makes it seem that traffic checkpoints have 
become more “an everyday part of American life” than a 
sobriety checkpoint in the early morning hours in the 
vicinity of bars or a narcotics checkpoint along routes 
frequented by drug traffickers.421 
In any event, it is hard to conclude that an innocent person would have 
any more reason to be upset about being seized as part of a narcotics 
interdiction campaign than to be seized to be asked about a past crime.422  
Additionally, the checkpoints conducted in Edmond operated generally 
during the day whereas the one in Lidster was conducted late at night, 
when presumably a motorist would be more apprehensive about being 
detained.423 
The second part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test 
relates to the importance of the government’s need to conduct the search 
or seizure in question and its effectiveness at achieving this purpose.424  
In Lidster, the police established the checkpoint to inquire about a fatal 
hit-and-run accident that had occurred in the vicinity.425  In Edmond, 
checkpoints were set up based on, among other things, crime statistics 
and traffic flow.426  The purpose of the checkpoints in Edmond was to 
interdict the flow of drugs into a city that had felt the terrible effects of 
the rampant use of illegal drugs.427  It is not dismissive of the seriousness 
of the need to investigate a past hit and run fatality to recognize that the 
roadblock established in Lidster was directed at only one crime.428  The 
roadblocks in Edmond were established to prevent many drug crimes and 
violence that flows directly and indirectly from such crimes.429  It is 
difficult to see how an argument could be made that the government’s 
need in Edmond was any less than that in Lidster or more generally about 
                                                 
421 See Butterfoss, supra note 341, at 487–88 (referencing a paragraph from Mr. Butterfoss’ 
article detailing the purpose behind traffic stops and the effects it has on innocent 
individuals). 
422 See Dery & Meehan, supra note 405, at 121 (comparing the differences between Lidster 
and Edmond and each of their purposes for traffic stops). 
423 Id. at 111, 114. 
424 See supra Part VI.A (discussing the nature of government interest). 
425 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004). 
426 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35–36 (2000). 
427 Id. at 41–42. 
428 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427. 
429 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34–36 (conveying the facts of the case). 
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why searches or seizures whose primary purpose is to investigate crime 
is less important than those whose purposes are claimed to be otherwise. 
In conclusion, attempting to determine the legality of searches and 
seizures that are conducted without individualized suspicion based on 
whether the primary purpose of the investigative activity was to ferret 
out ordinary criminal wrongdoing leads to results that are difficult to 
understand, make little sense when they can be understood, encourage 
police manipulation, and work in opposition to Fourth Amendment 
principles.  A more effective way to make this determination should be 
used, and in fact, already exists.430 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has addressed the constitutionality of obtaining DNA 
samples from arrestees and using those samples to identify the arrestee 
and compare his DNA sample to those found at the scene of serious 
crimes.  The Article maintains that neither the presumption of innocence 
nor the arguments surrounding the Fourth Amendment are reasons for 
invalidating such testing.  Specifically, the presumption of innocence is 
basically a trial protection and has no bearing on the legality of a search 
or seizure.431  The test by which the Court determines the legality of a 
search or seizure is to balance the extent of the intrusion against the 
importance of the government’s interest in conducting the search or 
seizure.432  The DNA testing of arrestees accomplishes the important 
purpose of solving outstanding crimes, thus linking the guilty to the 
crime and exonerating those who may have been wrongly charged.433 
More broadly, this Article points to a better way for courts to apply 
the reasonableness test to searches or seizures done without 
individualized suspicion.  Courts should avoid being disingenuous and 
misleading when analyzing aspects of this reasonableness test such as 
the primary purpose of the intrusion, and whether and to what extent 
the subject of the intrusion has a diminished expectation of privacy.  
When it approved the suspicionless DNA testing of arrestees in King II, 
the Court deemphasized what was the actual primary purpose of the 
                                                 
430 Such an approach balances the extent of the intrusion against the need of the 
government to engage in it.  The first part of the balancing test includes consideration of 
whether the subject of the intrusion already has a diminished expectation of privacy.  The 
second part of the test encompasses the effectiveness of the government’s intrusion in 
accomplishing its purpose. 
431 See supra notes 114–21 and accompanying text (analyzing cases that determined DNA 
testing constituted a search). 
432 See supra Part V.A (discussing the level of intrusion). 
433 See supra Part V.A.2 (supporting the theory that DNA testing provides a more reliable 
evidence to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence). 
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test—the use of the samples to help solve crimes.434  Instead, the Court 
focused on how the samples could confirm the “identification” of the 
arrestee.435  Apparently this was done so the Court could avoid the 
holdings in some previous cases, which held that suspicionless Fourth 
Amendment intrusions were lawful only when their primary purpose 
was other than to ferret out crime.  This partial masking of the actual 
purpose of the testing in fact weakened the Court’s holding in King II 
and served as fodder for Justice Scalia’s stinging dissent. 
It is undisputed that an arrestee has a diminished expectation of 
privacy because of his confinement.436  What should be an especially 
significant aspect in analyzing the extent of intrusion however is 
compromised by the manner in which the Court has applied the 
diminished expectation of privacy principle in the past.  When it 
approved the suspicionless drug testing of certain students, the Court 
wrote that all students subjecting themselves to extra-curricular activities 
have a diminished expectation of privacy as compared to other 
students.437  If the Court wished to sanction drug testing students 
because of the government’s need to insure that students do not come to 
school high on drugs and because the schools act in loco parentis, it 
should have said so.  This would apply to all students and although a 
debatable conclusion, would foster an honest analysis.  However, 
applying the diminished expectation of privacy rationale to students 
because they participate in extracurricular activities was unpersuasive 
and counterproductive to developing a rational way of applying the 
reasonableness test.  It is reasonable to conclude, as the Court has, that 
one has less of an expectation of privacy in a car than in a home from the 
“pervasive regulation” of automobiles.438  This hardly leads to the 
                                                 
434 See supra Part VII (analyzing the King II opinion on the primary reasoning for the use 
of DNA testing). 
435 See supra Part VIII (providing that identification was a main focus of the court in King 
II). 
436 See supra notes 260–88 and accompanying text (reviewing case law which established 
a lower expectation of privacy for individuals incarcerated). 
437 See supra notes 302–07 and accompanying text (concluding that Earl’s decision 
lowered the expectation of privacy for students). 
438 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).  Originally the Court held this reduced 
expectation of privacy developed from the ready mobility of automobiles.  Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146, 151, 162 (1925).  Over time, the Court developed a second 
rationale for this reduced privacy expectation—the fact that automobiles are highly 
regulated.  As the Court wrote in South Dakota v. Opperman: 
Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing 
governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection 
and licensing requirements.  As an everyday occurrence, police stop 
and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have 
expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive 
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conclusion that although the police require a warrant before they can 
open a paper bag carried openly by a person in the street that they are 
excused from the warrant requirement when that bag is locked up in a 
suitcase and placed in the trunk of an automobile as the Courts holdings 
indicate.439  Although the Court has used the diminished expectation of 
privacy in these dubious ways, it should not take away from its 
significance when the subject of the intrusion has a genuine and 
substantial diminished expectation of privacy—as do arrestees in full 
custodial institutions.440  In such situations, this diminished expectation 
of privacy severely reduces the extent of the intrusion to the individual. 
Finally, this Article has reviewed those cases in which the Court has 
used the primary purpose test as a determining factor in analyzing 
whether suspicionless government intrusions violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Those cases are extremely inconsistent in both the 
definition and application of the test.441  In fact, the primary purpose test 
works to permit more substantial intrusions on those not suspected of 
criminal activity than for those who are suspected.442  Accordingly, the 
primary purpose test needs to be abandoned, or at least revisited by the 
Court, regarding its role in the application of the Fourth Amendment. 
  
                                                                                                             
noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in 
proper working order. 
428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976). 
439 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (establishing that police had 
probable cause to view the contents of a brown paper bag that was located in the trunk of a 
vehicle). 
440 See supra notes 260–88 and accompanying text (reiterating the fact the incarcerated 
defendants do not share the same level of privacy as other citizens in the United States 
enjoy). 
441 See supra Part V (reviewing how the level of intrusion has been interrupted by the 
courts). 
442 See supra Part VI.C (illustrating that the courts have laid the foundation for protecting 
the privacy of people suspected of criminal activity, than those individuals who are not). 
